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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the different roles that networks play in political econ-
omy. In the first chapter, I study how a political party uses electoral data to monitor
and incentivize the political brokers who control its clientelistic networks. I study
networks organized around rural communal lands in Mexico, which are largely con-
trolled by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). I use the fact that the level
at which brokers operate (the communal land) does not necessarily coincide with the
level at which the electoral data is disclosed (the electoral section). Guided by a
simple model, I compute a measure of how informative the available electoral data is
about the performance of the PRI's political brokers, as a function of the degree of
overlap between communal lands and electoral sections. I compare the vote share for
the PRI in communal lands where the electoral data is more or less informative, both
when the PRI does and does not have access to resources to fund and incentivize
brokers. The results suggest that clientelistic networks contribute significantly to the
enforcement of clientelistic transactions.
In the second chapter, which is co-authored with Joana Monteiro, we study the
role of media in compensating political biases. In particular, we analyze how media
presence, connectivity and ownership affect the distribution of federal drought relief
transfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that municipalities that are not aligned
with the federal government have a lower probability of receiving funds conditional
on experiencing low precipitation. However, we show that the presence of radio
stations compensates for this bias. This effect is driven by municipalities that have
radio stations connected to a regional network rather than by the presence of local
radio stations. In addition, the effect of network-connected radio stations increases
with their network coverage. These findings suggests that the connection of a radio
station to a network is important because it increases the salience of disasters, making
it harder for the federal government to ignore non-allies. We show that our findings
are not explained by the ownership and manipulation of media by politicians.
In the third chapter, which is co-authored with Arun Chandrasekhar and Emily
Breza, we shed light on the relationship between network characteristics and invest-
ment decisions through a lab experiment in the field. We focus on the role for third
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parties to act as informal contract enforcers. Our protocol builds on a basic two-
party trust game with a sender and receiver, to which we introduce a third-party to
serve as either a monitor or punisher. The ex-ante benefits of a third party judge
are ambiguous. On one hand, a third party may result in larger sender transfers due
to her ability to punish. On the other hand, the punisher might act in a way to
build reputation or may crowd-out intrinsic motivation. Importantly, these costs and
benefits of a punisher might vary with her centrality in the network. Our findings are
consistent with both the role for the punisher to induce efficiency and to crowd out
intrinsic motivation. They are also consistent with the effects of reputation-building
by the punisher. Importantly, we find that very network-peripheral punishers are
detrimental to efficiency, while network-central individuals may improve outcomes
when given the technology to punish. We also show that these results cannot be
explained by either the fact that the punisher also acts as a monitor, or by the pun-
isher's characteristics such as elite status, educational attainment, caste, or proxies
for wealth.
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nomics
Thesis Supervisor: Tavneet Suri
Title: Maurice J. Strong Career Development Associate Professor
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Chapter 1
Monitoring Political Brokers:
Evidence from Clientelistic
Networks in Mexico
1.1 Introduction
Political clientelism -the distribution of benefits targeted to individuals or groups in
exchange for electoral support- is widespread in the developing world.1 Both the po-
litical science and economics literatures argue that clientelism undermines democracy
and economic development: it weakens the ability of citizens to hold elected officials
accountable, and it diverts public resources to fund clientelistic transactions. 2 While
the secret ballot does represent an obstacle for clientelism, the literature argues that
parties are able to circumvent it using local political brokers, who control networks
of voters and deliver their votes.3 To mobilize these so called clientelistic networks,
parties need to control resources to fund and incentivize brokers. Additionally, par-
ties need to monitor the performance of their brokers to make sure they deliver the
'Among others, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), and Schaffer (2007) document the prevalence of
clientelism in the developing world.
2Hicken (2011) provides a comprehensive survey of the recent literature on clientelism.
3 We later discuss different theories and supporting empirical evidence that Chandra (2004),
Stokes (2005), Nichter (2008), Finan and Schechter (2012), and Lawson and Greene (2012) provide.
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votes of their networks. While the literature has addressed the use of public resources
for clientelistic purposes, we have a limited understanding as to how parties monitor
their brokers.
In this paper, we study how a political party uses electoral data to monitor the
brokers that control its clientelistic networks. We study the context of clientelistic
networks on communal lands in Mexico, which are largely controlled by the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (PRI), a party that has traditionally relied on patronage
and clientelistic practices for electoral gain. Communal lands, which were allocated
through a land redistribution policy after the 1910 Mexican revolution, are tracts of
land where property rights belong to communities as a whole, but each individual
works on a specific plot and is entitled to its entire product. In each communal land
there is an elected official that participates in the distribution of the government
programs within the communal land. The literature and the fieldwork we conducted
show that, in the states under the PRI's control, these officials operate as the PRI's
political brokers, trading access to public programs for votes (Mackinlay Grohmann
(2011)). This is an important phenomenon since communal lands represent 50% of
agricultural land in M6xico and, according to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE),
their peasants have the largest risk of being subject to clientelistic practices (IFE
(2012)). 4
Our identification strategy exploits two sources of variation. First, we use whether
the PRI controls the state government at the time of the election to measure whether
the PRI controls the resources needed to fund and incentivize brokers. State govern-
ments control the implementation of the bulk of public programs at the local level
and incumbency is necessary to manipulate government funds for clientelistic pur-
poses (Beer (2007), Holzner (2010)).' Second, to measure differences in the PRI's
capacity to monitor its brokers, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in over-
lap between the level at which brokers operate -communal lands- and the level at
which the electoral data the PRI can use to monitor its brokers is disclosed -electoral
4Figure 1-1 illustrates the distribution of communal lands in Mexico.
5According to the municipal and state public finance records, the annual expenditure of the state
governments represents 80% of the joint expenditure of municipal and state governments.
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sections. 6 Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3 shows some examples of the variation in this
overlap.
The literature, the fieldwork experience and the popular press suggest that the PRI
uses electoral data to monitor the votes they secured through clientelistic practices.7
In particular, Holzner (2003) suggests that the PRI monitors the electoral support
from communal lands using electoral data and punishes the political brokers that
fail to deliver the vote of their communities. During our fieldwork in the month
prior to the 2012 federal election, several peasants, who were polling station officials
representing the PRI in past elections, stated that the party watched electoral section
level outcomes closely to make sure that the figures matched the expected support.
To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a simple model that characterizes the
relationship between the PRI's monitoring capacity over its broker and the electoral
support for the PRI in a communal land. In the model, the PRI and another party
compete for votes offering a policy menu of public goods and transfers to voters.
In addition, when the PRI is the incumbent party, it has access to resources to
fund and incentivize a broker to mobilize its clientelistic networks. The PRI uses the
available electoral section-level data to extract a signal about its broker's performance
on which it conditions his funding. The overlap between the communal land and its
overlapping electoral sections determines the precision of the signal, and therefore,
the PRI's monitoring capacity. The model predicts that, when the PRI controls the
government, communal lands where the electoral data allows high PRI monitoring
ability should exhibit a larger electoral support for the PRI. The model predicts no
difference when another party controls the government.
As a measure of the PRI's ability to monitor its brokers, we use what we denote
as the fit of a communal land, which is the weighted average proportion of communal
land voters in the electoral sections where they vote. For illustrative purposes, Fig-
6Electoral sections are the smallest electoral demarcation in M6xico.
'An illustrative example from the popular press comes from the state of Nuevo Leon, where
the PRI candidate for the state governorship acknowledge that they had an army of 100 thousand
individuals to monitor the election (of 2,677,343 registered voters) and that 30 thousand of those
were trained to work as representatives at the polling stations. The National Action Party (PAN)
contender argued that the goal of such an army was to monitor the votes they secured through
clientelistic practices (Reyes and Romo (2003)).
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ure 1-4 shows one case of large fit and one case of small fit. Fit is a measure of overlap
between communal lands where brokers operate and electoral sections where the PRI
observes the electoral results it can use to monitor them, and thus it naturally affects
the PRI's monitoring ability. A larger fit improves this ability, since the electoral
section-level data is more informative about the work of brokers.
The results of the empirical analysis support the predictions of the model. Com-
munal lands with larger fit display a larger electoral support for the PRI. In addition,
this difference in votes only happens when the PRI controls the state government.
To address the concern that results might be driven by omitted unobservable vari-
ables that predict PRI's electoral support and correlate with fit, we conduct a placebo
test, looking at incumbency at the municipal rather than at the state government.
PRI's incumbency at the municipal level is correlated with PRI's electoral support
but should not allow the PRI to mobilize its clientelistic networks on communal lands
since municipalities have a very limited budget relative to state governments. Our
placebo exercise indicates that there is no differential effect of fit on the electoral
support for the PRI.
The estimated effect of the communal land fit is meaningful. A one standard
deviation increase in fit corresponds to a 1.5 percentage points increase in the vote
share for the PRI. Such an effect accounts for one fifth of the incumbency advantage
that the PRI enjoys when it controls the state government.
We then provide evidence that suggests that clientelistic networks operating in
communal lands have an aggregate effect on election and policy outcomes. We use
a difference in differences strategy where we compare municipalities with different
shares of communal lands while controlling for the share of agricultural land, which
includes communal and privates lands. We show that, when the PRI controls the
state government, municipalities with a larger share of communal lands exhibit an
increased vote share for the PRI and a lower provision of public goods, measured
by the number of schools and teachers per capita. These results are not driven by
differential pretrends or differences in the economic development of communal and
private lands. A similar placebo test as before indicates no differential effect of the
15
share of communal lands on electoral and policy outcomes.
Our work is closely related to the literature on clientelistic networks. 8 In semi-
nal work, Stokes (2005) observes that machines use their deep insertion into voters'
social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer the votes of individ-
uals. Chandra (2004) advocates that clientelistic networks facilitate the monitoring
of turnout, an idea later formalized and tested by Nichter (2008). Auyero (2000),
Finan and Schechter (2012), and Lawson and Greene (2012) argue that clientelis-
tic networks mitigate asymmetric information about voter's reciprocity, which allows
parties to target benefits to individuals who are more likely to reciprocate with their
vote.
Our work is also related to Robinson and Verdier (2013), Keefer (2006), and Keefer
(2007), who argue that clientelism leads to an underprovision of public goods. We
provide empirical evidence that supports their claim. To our knowledge, we are the
first to provide empirical evidence that clientelism has a significant effect on aggregate
electoral and policy outcomes. Finally, our work is also related to the literature that
looks at the overlap between political markets and the level at which different types
of information are disclosed. A prominent example is Snyder and Stromberg (2010),
who look at the fit between political districts and newspaper markets.
Section 1.2 describes the historical development of clientelistic networks on com-
munal lands in Mexico. It also discusses the current clientelistic practices in these
lands and reports the qualitative evidence that was collected during our fieldwork. To
guide the empirical work, section 1.3 presents a model that captures the relationship
between the PRI's monitoring capacity over its political brokers and the electoral
support for the PRI in communal lands. Section 1.4 presents the empirical strategy
and data. The empirical tests of the predictions of the model are in section 1.5. In
section 1.6, we provide empirical evidence that supports that clientelistic networks on
communal lands have aggregate effects on election and policy outcomes. Section 1.7
concludes.
SAlso see Hicken (2011), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Manzetti and Wilson (2007), and Schaf-
fer (2007) for a discussion on the work that documents the presence and features of clientelistic
practices in developing economies.
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1.2 Background
In this section, we highlight the main features of the historical development of clien-
telistic networks on communal lands. We place particular emphasis on how the PRI
captured the administrative office of each communal land. We then explain current
clientelistic practices in communal lands. We stress the importance of the PRI's con-
trol of state government to mobilize its clientelistic networks and the inability of other
parties to take over the PRI's networks in states lost by the PRI. We conclude by
presenting supporting qualitative data we collected during fieldwork in twelve munic-
ipalities across four states. We complement this data with qualitative evidence from
the Mexican press to give a broader view of these issues across the whole of Mexico.
1.2.1 Historical Background
After the 1910 Mexican revolution, where the redistribution of land was the central
demand of the rural insurgents, there was significant land redistribution (Knight
(1986)). Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution established the distribution of land in the
form of either agrarian communities or ejidos, to which we refer jointly as communal
lands. 9 The 1917 Constitution established the office of the commissariat to administer
each communal land. Commissariats are democratically elected officials that mediate
between the peasants of the communal lands and the government. Among their many
responsibilities, they are in charge of the access and distribution of the government
programs for their communities.
During its seven decades in power, the PRI established clientelistic networks on
communal lands by controlling the commissariats through the state agrarian leagues
of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC). The poor peasants living in com-
munal lands, with no individual property rights, faced difficulties accessing private
9Agrarian communities represented the restitution of lands that were expropriated from commu-
nities of peasants during the rule of Porfirio Diaz between 1876 and 1910. During this period, there
was extensive illegal expropriation of lands from communities of small landholders by landlords that
led to a dramatic land concentration. Ejidos consisted of land that was granted to communities of
petitioners that never had land. The logic behind the communal property rights over the land was
to avoid the illegal expropriation and land concentration that took place during the rule of Porfirio
Diaz.
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credit markets and relied on the government for access to agricultural inputs. This
dependence, together with their internal legal organization, made communal lands the
perfect ground for the development of clientelistic networks (Sabloff (1981)). Com-
missariats became the PRI's political brokers, trading access to public programs for
votes (Bafios Ramirez (1988)), Mackinlay Grohmann (2011).10 In turn, commissariats
enjoy the rents associated with their powerful position. Their discretionary control
in the distribution of public programs to the interior of their communities facilitates
the extraction of rents (Gonzilez Martinez (1997), Sabloff (1981)).
1.2.2 Recent Changes
Mexico underwent a profound democratic transition in the last two decades that para-
doxically led to a strengthening of the clientelistic practices in rural Mexico (Schedler
(2004)). A series of political reforms, beginning with a constitutional reform approved
in 1989 and led by the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) in 1990, elim-
inated vote fraud practices (e.g., ballot stuffing, intimidation, manipulation of voter
registration lists, issuing multiple voting credentials to PRI supporters, multiple vot-
ing by PRI supporters). The PRI's response to the loss of its traditional methods of
controlling election results was to change its electoral strategy by shifting from vote
fraud to clientelism and vote buying.
In the last two decades, the functioning of the CNC and the PRI's clientelistic
networks on communal lands has heavily relied on the funds from the PRI's state
governments." Municipal governments are very weak and state governments are
responsible for the execution of the bulk of public programs at the local level. The
PRI's state governors took advantage of the fiscal decentralization that took place
in the 1990's to make use of the federal funds for clientelistic exchanges and the
100ften, the PRI operates through a local cacique instead, who in turn controls the commissariats.
Caciques usually start as commissariats (Gonzilez Martinez (1997)).
"An illustrative example comes from the state of Tlaxcala, where the PRI lost the state govern-
ment in 1991, and returned in 2011. When the PRI recovered the state governorship, the president
of the CNC in this state acknowledged that the peasant organization had lost presence in the state
as a result of the political rivalry with the past two state governments. However, he asserted that
he trusted that the organization would be able to recover its strength with the return of the PRI to
the state government (Osorno Xochipa (2011)).
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strengthening of their clientelistic networks in rural areas (Cornelius (2002)). The
role of the PRI's state governments in the endurance of the party at the local level
became even more important after the PRI lost the federal government to the National
Action Party (PAN) in the 2000 presidential election (Langston (2003)).
Despite the PRI's loss of several states, and the consequent weakening of the
influence of the CNC in these states, other political parties have not been able to
contest the power of the CNC and take over the PRI's political networks in communal
lands. The main reason is that the PAN and the Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD) were not able to create a structure of control of commissariats in communal
lands like the PRI did with the CNC during its long tenure in power. 12 The PAN
created the Rural Action Program (PAR) in 2004 to coordinate the PAN's rural
supporters (Cortes (2004), Soto (2004)). However, the PAN's project was a total
failure (Galicia (2012)). In 1988, dissidents of the PRI and the CNC founded the
Cardenist Peasant Central (CCC) to support the main contender against the PRI's
candidate for presidency and challenge the PRI and the CNC's hegemony in the rural
sector. Despite the fact that affiliates of the CCC belong to several leftist parties,
including the PRI, the CCC has been mostly associated with the various forms of
the PRD. However, the weight of the CCC in the communal land sector is minimal
relative to that of the CNC. The most conservative estimates indicate that the CCC's
affiliates account for less than 3% of the CNC's.1 3
The CNC has no equal. It has 88 federal legislators in the Chamber of Deputies,
which represent 18% of the total, and a comparable political strength in the states.
Thus, in coordination with state government, the CNC plays a very important role
in the allocation of resources at the local level (Galicia (2012)). The manipulation of
social programs for electoral purposes in M xico is severe (Martinez (2010)). Alianza
Civica, the main NGO that monitors electoral practices in Mexico, estimates that
during the 2009 election 27% of citizens were subject to vote buying and the condi-
tioning of social programs for their votes (Zermefio (2012)). There are no separate
12 The PAN and the PRD are mostly urban parties with weaker presence in rural areas.
"According the CCC website, http://cccardenista.net/, it has one hundred thousand affiliates.
According to Zermefio (2011), unofficial figures suggest that the CNC has 4.5 million affiliates.
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estimates for the individuals living in communal lands but, according to the figures of
the CNC, its affiliates contribute more than 35% of the PRI's votes. After the PRI's
loss in the 2000 presidential election, the federal legislators of the CNC claimed that
they were the only PRI sector that fulfilled its vote quota, 6 million votes (Ramos
(2000)). 14
1.2.3 Evidence from Fieldwork and the Popular Press
During the fieldwork we conducted in the month prior to the 2012 presidential elec-
tion, we observed a strong presence of the PRI's clientelistic practices in communal
lands in the states that have always been under PRI control. On the contrary, we did
not observe such practices in communal lands in states that the PRI previously lost
to other parties. We conducted fieldwork in twelve municipalities of four states of
Mexico, which present a range of political configurations that are particularly relevant
for our analysis: M6xico, Morelos, Puebla and Tlaxcala." The state of Mexico is the
PRI's largest stronghold in M6xico; it has always controlled the state government and
the majority of the municipal governments. Similarly, the PRI just lost the state of
Puebla to the PAN in 2010. In contrast, in Morelos, the PRI lost the state govern-
ment in 2000 to the PAN, which had control until 2012, when it lost to the PRD.
Likewise, in Tlaxcala, the PRI just returned to state government in 2011 after two
terms of non-PRI governors. During fieldwork we noted a strong prevalence of the
PRI's clientelistic practices in communal lands in the state of Mexico and important
residuals of these in the state of Puebla. However, these practices appeared to be
absent in the states of Morelos and Tlaxcala.
141t is also worth a brief mention of Mexico's communal land certification program, which started
in 1992 with the reform of Article 27 of the Constitution. The so called PROCEDE (Programa de
Certificacion de Derechos Ejidales y Titulacio'n de Solares) consists of two main stages. The first
stage constitutes a certification process in which each communal land has its boundaries delineated,
and its land is divided into land for common use and land for individual plots. Additionally, the
plots designated for private use are demarcated and renting is permitted. In a second stage, if a
super-majority of the communal land members agree, peasants have the option of registering their
plots into the private domain and then their land enters the private market. While most communal
land has gone through the first stage, less than 3% has entered the private domain. Consequently,
the PROCEDE has had a modest impact on the socio-economic situation of communal lands.
1 Please refer to Appendix 1.7 for detailed supporting anecdotal evidence.
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In the state of Mexico, we found evidence that supports the presence of PRI
clientelistic practices. We observed a close relationship between commissariats and
the PRI's government: in all municipalities we visited, at least one commissariat or
relative of the commissariat works in the government. Also, commissariats stated that
the PRI's supporters in communal lands receive considerably more public assistance
from the PRI's government. They also added that, for that to happen, it is crucial
that commissariats are aligned with the party. In addition, we observed a conditioning
of government support within communal lands by commissariats.
In the state of Puebla, we noticed that the PRI's clientelistic networks on com-
munal lands are still present but they are weakening. The state of Puebla provides
an interesting case study given the recent transition from the PRI to the PAN at the
state government level. As in the state of Mexico, we observed that most commissari-
ats, which were elected under a PRI's governor, continue to support the PRI openly.
Not surprisingly, the PRI's commissariats report a significant decrease in government
aid with the recent party transition. Commissariats also mention a radical change in
the conditioning of the state government assistance for electoral support. When asked
about this matter, a commissariat explained, "when the PRI was in government, the
conditioning was a serious problem. If we voted for the PRI, there was aid, if we
did not, we were marginalized. With the change in government, everything is more
flexible; people can vote for the party they want and the aid will still come."
The evidence from newspapers reflects that our observations from the states of
Mexico and Puebla are not unique to those states. Given the limited geographical
coverage of our fieldwork, we complement it with qualitative data from the popular
press. Qualitative evidence from newspapers suggests that, while the individuals from
communal lands that support the PRI benefit the most when it comes to receiving
aid, assistance to and within communal lands is conditioned on political support.
Further, in the states of Mexico and Puebla, we observed that parties intervene
in the political life of the communal lands to gain their political control. The PRI's
control of the commissariats is a political asset since it is a necessary condition for the
PRI to be able to mobilize its clients in the communal lands. Thus, candidates for
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commissariat often run representing a party, and vote buying and fraud characterize
elections for commissariats. This situation is not unique to the states of our fieldwork.
Many other cases show up in newspapers.
In the states of Morelos and Tlaxcala, we found limited evidence on clientelistic
practices in communal lands. Commissariats stress that, while there was a condition-
ing of the assistance for electoral support in the times before the PRI lost the state
government, that is no longer the case. Additionally, they mention that the rules of
the programs of the state government are clear and these are not distributed to favor
individuals associated to a given political party. It is worth noticing the relevance of
these facts for the state of Tlaxcala, where the PRI returned to power two years ago.
They suggest that, despite the return of the PRI to the state government, clientelistic
exchanges are not as strong as before the PRI lost the state government.
Finally, the evidence we observed during fieldwork corroborates the mentioned
role of the CNC. On the one hand, commissariats and peasants in the state of Mexico
report current support from the CNC. Evidence from newspapers also reveals that,
in the states under the control of the PRI, the CNC conditions government assistance
for electoral support to the PRI. On the other hand, commissariats and peasants of
the states of Morelos, Puebla and Tlaxcala agree that the CNC disappeared together
with the PRI when the PRI lost the state elections. However, commissariats in the
state of Tlaxcala, where the PRI recovered the state government recently, indicated
that there were several signs that the CNC was coming back to action. Additionally,
we observed evidence that the PRI's clientelistic networks are latent and the return
of the PRI to the state government, with the consequent strengthening of CNC,
could reanimate the PRI's clientelistic practices in communal lands. A commissariat
pointed out, "I do not support the PRI but, if the CNC returns, we will have to
support the PRI so that we get government help."
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1.3 Model
Our goal in this section is to develop a simple model to guide the empirical work. The
model makes two contributions to our analysis. First, it characterizes the relationship
between the PRI's capacity to monitor its political broker and the electoral support
for the PRI in such a communal land. The model studies the case where the PRI
controls the state government as well as the case where it does not. Second, the
model links the PRI's monitoring capacity to the communal land fit we measure
in the data. The main prediction of the model is that, when the PRI controls the
state government, there should be a larger support for the PRI in communal lands
where a large fit allows better PRI monitoring capacity. However, there should be no
difference otherwise.
1.3.1 Setup
The model builds on a standard probabilistic voting model to which we add a standard
principal-agent problem that incorporates the way the PRI monitors and provides
incentives to its political broker so that he delivers the votes of its network. As
the anecdotal evidence suggests (Holzner (2003)), the PRI faces an agency problem
since, once the broker receives funds from the PRI, he has no incentives to exert
any effort or to spend the funds to persuade voters to vote for the PRI. To address
this problem, the PRI uses the available electoral data to extract a signal about the
broker's performance on which it conditions funds to incentivize him.
Consider a communal land c inhabited by a population of peasants normalized
to one. There are two political parties, the PRI and other party denoted by 0
that compete for the control of the government of state where the communal land is
located. When in office, a party p uses the budget be, assigned to the communal land,
to invest in a public good gp, to make a transfer -rf to individuals, and to potentially
fund and incentivize a political broker, wp, (g+ ±+ T± w, 5 bc).
A political broker that works for a given party p can exert an effort, a,, to persuade
voters to vote for party p. The effort is costly and a unit of effort a, has a convex
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cost }a'. The effort a, can potentially encompass the energy to investigate the voters
with the largest reciprocity as well as the funds that the broker targets to these voters
(Finan and Schechter (2012), and Lawson and Greene (2012)). It could also represent
the use of resources to identify and mobilize unlikely-to-vote supporters of party p
(Chandra (2004), Nichter (2008)).
Parties choose the level of public goods, transfers and funds for political brokers
to maximize their vote share and peasants are assumed to vote sincerely. From the
perspective of parties, the utility of peasants of the communal land over the public
good, the transfer, and political broker's effort is
us,c (gc, ic, a -exp (- (uc (gc) + , + + (,c + cp',c) Ipp), (11)
where uc (-) is increasing in its argument and strictly concave, Ipaj is an indicator
for the PRI coming to the state office, o2, is an idiosyncratic ideology shock towards
the PRI distributed uniformly on [-1, ]1, and qc is a normally distributed error
that reflects the uncertainty about Uc (.), ,c ~ K (0, of). We interpret oc2 as the
degree of aggregate uncertainty about the potential voting behavior of peasants of
the communal land. Note that we take a reduced form approach and assume that
the effort of the political broker a, enters directly in the average voter's utility over
party p's policies. This assumption reflects that the effort that the political broker
exerts, ap, is able to influence voters' utility for party p.
Given the setup, as in a standard probabilistic voting model, the vote share for
the PRI is
FR = + ± (uc (g'RI) - u (go) + rjMR - rb + apRI - ao) ± ,c, (1.2)
where 77 represents the uncertainty about the potential voting behavior of peasants
in communal land for a given policy vector (gaRl, ra, aaRI, go, To, ao).
We assume that only the PRI has access to a political broker. This assumption
mimics the evidence from the literature and our fieldwork, and the fact that the
peasant organizations of other political parties are minimal relative to the PRI's CNC.
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Additionally, we assume that, only when the PRI controls the state government, is
it able to use public resources to fund its political broker to mobilize its networks. 16
Henceforth, since ao and wo are always zero, we drop the subscript in appj and WpRI.
When in control of the state government, the PRI offers a political broker oper-
ating in the communal land a linear contract w = f + - s, with f, v > 0, where
s = a ± e represents a noisy signal of a with e - AC (0, of), which we discuss in depth
shortly.1 7 For simplicity we assume that the political broker has the following utility
over a contract (f, v) of
E [u' (f, v)] = E -exp -f + o - s - a .)) (1.3)
Additionally, we assume that the political broker has an outside option of 0, and
hence, a contract (f, v) has to be such that E [ub (f, v)] > 0.18
1.3.2 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. nature draws the incumbent party,
2. each party p announces (g, -T),
3. the PRI proposes contract (f, v) to its political broker and he accepts,
4. shocks {<p'ic and rf are realized,
5. broker exerts effort a,
6. voters vote sincerely,
16We could think of this game as the stage game of a dynamic game where current funds destined to
mobilize political brokers and to fund clientelistic transactions were determined in the past election.
Hence, when voters vote for the PRI, they are aware that a share of the future budget will be used
for clientelistic purposes in future elections.
17The restriction to linear contracts is common in the literature, justified by the work by Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987).
181n equation (1.3) we implicitly assume that the broker experiences no utility over gpc, T, ric and
<pse. This avoids considering the potential convoluted case where the broker ends up working for
the PRI but voting for the other party.
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7. party p wins,
8. winner implements (ge, -r), and
9. The PRI extracts a signal s over the effort a and pays its political broker w
according to (f, v),
where 3., 5. and 9. occur only if the PRI controls the state government.
1.3.3 Signal Extraction
To construct the signal s on which the PRI conditions funds to the broker, the PRI
uses the election data available at the electoral section level as well as its imper-
fect knowledge about the potential voting behavior of individuals inside and outside
communal lands.19 For exposition, we consider the case where the peasants of the
communal land vote in a single electoral section e. The electoral section has a share
a of voters that come from the communal land and a share 1 - a from outside the
communal land. Note that a coincides with our definition of the communal land fit.
Thus, the electoral support for the PRI of the voters from the electoral section e is
rI= air + (1 - a) 77, (1.4)
where 7'R, 7 which is defined in equation (1.2), represents the electoral support for the
PRI of the voters that belong to the communal land. Wrj is the analogous element
for the voters outside the communal land but without a since we assume that no
clientelistic networks operate in non-communal lands.20
Recall that 77c and q" are independently normally distributed errors -qc ~ N (0, of)
and 77c ~ N (0, uc)- that reflect the uncertainty about -PRI and 7rce, respectively.
We assume that o2 < oc2 to replicate that political brokers and the PRI might have
better information about the potential voting behavior of peasants in communal lands
relative to the one of outsiders.
19This knowledge about the potential voting behavior of individuals comes from the known part
of their preferences and the promises over the public good and the transfer by parties.
20 nc _1 nen g ) ,~ -7C n7
rPRI = + Un (gPRI) R ~ ( + 77
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Using the expressions of Wrrr, WRI, and 7r" the PRI extracts the following
signal about the effort of the broker a,
s = a + E, (1.5)
whre1=-ca) ,nc 2 .2 + &)2 ,,2 21 Note that the precision of thewnere6=E ?1+ a)? with o,. =u ±rc + precsio
signal is increasing in the fit of the communal land,
e2 = -2 3 ) c < 0. (1.6)
-5a a
This result is driven by two related elements. First, a larger communal land fit in-
creases the signal to noise ratio. While the votes from communal land individuals
are informative about the broker's performance, the votes from non-communal land
individuals only provide noise. Thus, a larger fit makes electoral data more infor-
mative. Second, the assumption that oc2 < U2 implies that a larger fit might not
only increase the signal to noise ratio but also reduce the variance of the noise. The
uncertainty about the potential voting behavior of individuals is what prevents the
PRI from being able to extract a noiseless signal about the broker's effort. Hence,
if this uncertainly is smaller for the communal land voters, a larger fit reduces the
overall uncertainty.
1.3.4 Characterization of the Case Without Clientelism
We start by characterizing the case when another party controls the state government
at the time of the election. Since we only characterize the equilibrium from the
communal land, throughout the rest of our characterization we drop the superscript
c. In this case there is no clientelism in equilibrium given that, since the PRI does
not have access to resources to fund and incentivize its political broker, he exerts
no effort to mobilize voters to vote for the PRI. Hence, PRI chooses (gpRa, TpRj) to
2Note that s = PRI - - [u' (9PR) - Uc (90) ± TPRI r] -
[Unc (9PRI) - Unc (__) RI - c']. In constructing the variance of signal for tractability
we assume that 1C and 7nc are independent.
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maximize its expected electoral support,
max{u (g) + -r} (1.7){g,r}
s.t.
g+r ; b (1.8)
g,r > 0, (1.9)
where equation (1.7) is the part of the PRI's vote share in equation (1.2) that the PRI
can influence, and equation (1.8) is the budget constraint. Thus, from the first order
conditions of the maximization problem and the budget constraint, the PRI chooses
0 = u'-1 (1) and -rpRr = b - u'-' (1). By symmetry, the other party chooses
g = u'-1 (1) and To = b - u' 1 (1). Thus, in the case without clientelism, both
parties offer the same public good and transfer. Consequently, using the expression
of the PRI's vote share in equation (1.2) and (gponj, r,0j, go, ro), the vote share for
the PRI is
1
PRI = + 7 (1.10)
and there is Downsian convergence, i.e., there is an ex-ante equal vote share for both
parties.
1.3.5 Characterization of the Case With Clientelism
When the PRI controls the state government, it has access to resources to fund and
incentivize its political broker. The other party chooses g0rI = -1 (1) and -rOP
b - u'- 1 (1) as in the no clientelism case. However, the PRI chooses (gpRp, TpRI, f, v)
to maximize its expected electoral support,
max {u(g) +T+a} (1.11)
{g,r,f,v}
s.t.
g + T + f + v -a <b (1.12)
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g,T ,7f, v > 0 (1.13)
a E arg max 1 - exp -f + v - a - V.201 2 4)
12 1f +v-a- v2 - 2 22 (1.15)2 2
where equation (1.11) is the part of the PRI's vote share in (1.2) that the PRI can in-
fluence, equation (1.12) reflects the expected budget constraint, equation (1.14) is the
incentive compatibility constraint, which follows directly by using equation (1.3) and
applying the moment generating function of a normal variable, and equation (1.15)
is the individual rationality constraint. The incentive compatibility constraint makes
sure that the political broker exerts the effort desired by the PRI, and the individual
rationality constraint ensures that the broker accepts the contract (f, v).
Replacing equations (1.12), (1.14) and (1.15) into equation (1.11), we rewrite the
problem as
max U b--r- - (1 + o2) v2 +7+(v
vr>O 2
where the first order conditions are given by
V : -U' b - (+ o2) v2 (1 + o2) V + 1 =0, (1.17)
r : -u' (b - (1+ ) v2 +1+ AT = 0 (1.18)
To characterize the equilibrium outcome we can consider the case where r > 0 is
not binding, which we denote as case A, and the case where r > 0 is binding, which
we denote as case B.
Case A (r > 0 is not binding)
In the case where r > 0 is not binding, clientelism does not distort the allocation of
the public good. The PRI's budget allocation to the public goods and transfer are
gP4 = '-1 (1) and -rjj = -u'- (1) - respectively. Further, the PRI offers
the broker a contract (f, v) = " , where we assume that o > 1, and the
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broker exerts an effort a = 1
Note that in this case clientelism does not alter the investment in the public
good because of the assumption that the utility function of the voters is linear in the
transfer. However, in the absence of this assumption, the conditioning of transfers
for electoral support would alter the investment on the public good just as it does in
the case where r > 0 is binding. Note from the expression of rff that the larger the
precision of the signal, the more likely that -r > 0 is binding, since more funds are
crowded out from transfers to fund the broker.
Using the expression of the PRI's vote share in (1.2) and (gPRj, Trp , a, gIU, -rgR),
the vote share for the PRI when it controls the state office at the time of the election
is
1 1
7ri-RI= + +'77 (1.19)2 2 (1 +o,2)
Case B (r > 0 is binding)
In the case where r > 0 is binding, clientelism distorts the allocation of the public good
since the funds destined to clientelistic exchanges crowd out the public good. The
PRI's budget allocation to the public goods and transfer are gRj = b - j (1+ 2) v 2
and TPRI = 0, respectively, where v is implicitly defined by equation (1.17). In
addition, differentiating the first order condition equation (1.17), we show that the
distortion on the public good is increasing in the precision of the signal, which, as we
show below, captures the PRI's monitoring capacity.22
In this case, the vote share for the PRI when it controls the state office at the
time of the election, Tr,, does not take a closed form solution.
1.3.6 Estimating the Return to Clientelism
The increase in the electoral support that the PRI achieves in communal lands through
the performance of its political broker, which we denote as AbrPRI, is the difference
between the vote share for the PRI when it controls the state office at the time of the
22 ?.2Ep = 1 v -" (g)(1+72,)_YOV+2u'(9)(12 )
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election, 7rPR, and the vote share for the PRI when it does not, IrI0-
Note that, from the envelope condition of the PRI's maximization problem in
(1.16), A7rppj is increasing in the precision of the signal over the performance of the
political broker, A I < 0.23 The intuition is that, when the precision of the signal
is large, the marginal cost for the PRI to incentivize the political broker to exert effort
is small. Thus, the increase in the electoral support due to clientelistic practices is
larger.
We now develop a strategy to bring this testable implication of the model to the
data. For that note that we can rewrite ArpRI as
1
PrIa = 2+e- Ar + (1.20)
where IPR is an indicator variable for whether the PRI controls the state government
at the time of the election. Linearizing (1.20) on the fit of the communal land,
7rP =00 +01 -IPRI +-02 _ fit-03 ' ' fit, (-1
where #2 = 0 and #3 = " >0. #33>0 since Awr RIis increasing in the
aO xPRI
precision of the signal over the performance of the political broker, O0" < 0, and,
from (1.6), the precision of the signal is increasing in the fit of the communal land,
< 0. The intuition for #3 > 0 is that a larger fit allows the PRI extracting a
more precise signal about the performance of its broker. In turn, since the broker is
risk-averse, a more precise signal facilitates the provision of incentives by the PRI,
and therefore, delivers a larger electoral return to the funds allocated to the broker.
1.3.7 Predictions of the Model
The model first predicts that there should be a larger vote share for the PRI in
communal lands with a larger fit when the PRI is in control of the state government.
In these lands the PRI has better monitoring capacity, which facilitates the PRI's
23 aA IICRI -- }' (g) 0. The same conclusion rises in case A.
(g) V <0.TesmcocuinrssicaeA
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work at incentivizing them to exert more effort in persuading peasants to vote for the
PRI
Second, the model predicts that the communal land fit should have no association
with the vote share for the PRI when the it does not control the state government,
since it has no resources to fund and incentivize its political broker, and consequently,
its monitoring capacity is irrelevant.
Lastly, the model predicts that places with more clientelism should experience a
lower public good provision since the resources to fund and incentivize the broker
crowd out the budget that otherwise would be allocated to public goods. Note that,
while this prediction is actually only for Case B, we have explained that this prediction
is absent in Case A due to the artifice of linear utility in the transfer.
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In this section we develop the empirical strategy used to test the predictions of the
model. Our empirical approach tests whether communal lands with a larger fit exhibit
larger electoral support for the PRI when the state government is under the control
of the PRI.
The variation in fit comes from the initial location of the communal lands and the
subsequent drawing of the electoral sections. In 1994, the Federal Electoral Institute
(IFE) designed the sections for electoral purposes so that each included a minimum of
50 and a maximum of 1500 voters. Additionally, each electoral section was conceived
to fall fully within a single municipality and to avoid the partition of voters from the
same locality.
The demarcation had no political considerations, which is essential for the valid-
ity of the identification strategy. When the IFE demarcated the electoral sections
in 1994, it represented an autonomous institution administered by a body of coun-
cilors, who are citizens with no links to any party or state branch. To get a sense
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of the institutional strength of the IFE, note that the 1994 federal elections were the
first conducted by the IFE, and it was the first time in Mexican history that elec-
tions were free from vote fraud (Schedler (2004)). Additionally, the electoral sections
were demarcated inside already set municipalities and electoral districts. Hence, the
political manipulation of electoral sections could not have allowed for the grouping
of voters to win municipalities or electoral districts, a strategy commonly known as
gerrymandering.
The variation in the PRI's control of the state government comes mostly from
states switching from the PRI to another party. The PRI not only held Mexico's
presidency for 71 years, but for a long period it also controlled the politics of all
states, many of which are still under the control of the PRI. In our period of analysis
(1991 - 2010), out of 31 sates, 17 states experienced a change in party in the state
government.' Additionally, out of these states, the PRI recently regained the state
government in four.
The main outcome of our empirical analysis is the vote share for the PRI in
municipal elections. Since municipal and state government elections are commonly
staggered, the electoral support for the PRI in interim municipal elections represents a
signal to the PRI about the good performance of its political brokers in mobilizing its
networks. Hence, if the PRI is able to successfully mobilize its clientelistic networks
when it controls the state government, this should be reflected in its electoral support
in municipal elections. In addition, municipal elections also have the advantage that
they take place every three years, which provides a large sample size and allows us to
analyze pretrends.2 5
Our analysis is at the electoral section level and our estimation equation follows
2413 out the other 14 states have always had a state governor of the PRI.
25The available state election data provides little variation to empirically test the implications of
the model. State government elections take place every six years and the data at the section and
municipal level is not available for many states for the first half of the period of analysis. This lack
of data constitutes a serious problem since identification comes from states that switch from the PRI
to another party. Many states have missing state government election data under the PRI, which
removes them from the sample of identifying observations.
33
directly from aggregating (1.21) to the electoral section level,26
7remst = A0 1 I + 2 - fitems +#3 - I/33 - fitems (1.22)
+1''Xemst + A'Gems + 77ms + #y + Eemst (1.23)
where 7remst is the vote share for the PRI in electoral section e in municipality m
in state s in year t, ItM is an indicator of whether the PRI controls the state gov-
ernment at the time of the election, and fitems is the communal land fit aggregated
at the electoral section level, 27 7,m, are municipality fixed effects, which control for
municipality characteristics that are invariant over time. A more robust specification
includes electoral section fixed effects /em,, and therefore, identification only comes
from communal lands that experienced a change in the party that controls the state
government. #t are year dummies that control for national level trends. A more
robust specification includes state-year dummies, #,,t, which control for state-level
trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Recall that the model from Section 3 predicts that #2 = 0 and #3 > 0. In words,
communal lands with larger fit should exhibit a larger support for the PRI but only
when the PRI controls the state government.
Xemst includes controls for area, number of registered voters and communal land
share, and the interaction of these variables with I8 tRI. Xemt addresses the concern
that fit may pick differences in these variables, which might be associated with other
correlates of electoral support for the PRI. Gem, includes a series of flexible poly-
nomials of latitude and longitude of the centroid of each communal land interacted
with state dummies. Ge,, addresses the concern that the spatial distribution of fit is
correlated with the electoral support for the PRI.
The identification assumption is that fit is plausibly exogenous, and consequently,
26For details on the derivation of the estimation equation, please see Appendix 1.7.
2 7 fite,m,s = ae,m,s - Ej Pci,e,m,s fi tc,m,s where ae,m,, is the share of voters from communal
lands in the electoral section, Pc1 ,e,m,S is the share of voters from communal lands in the electoral
section that come from communal land ci, and fitct,m,, is the fit of communal land ci. To construct
fite,m,, we approximate ae,m,,, Pc,e,m,s, and fitcm,, using area shares: ae,m,, "arae,ms,
, , a_ e a , mse_ , , s a re ac,m ,seca re a e,m, ar e a ciM '3f a re a e,m , *Pcie,m,s Jreac,m,snra,3 7 andfitc ,m, e aEi'' areaci,m,a9 areae,m,.,
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uncorrelated with omitted unobservable variables that correlate with PRI's electoral
support. The prediction of the model that #2 = 0 helps us to address the validity
of the identification assumption. If #2 > 0, it would cast doubt about the plausible
exogeneity of fit. Additionally, we conduct a placebo analysis, which we describe later
in detail, that supports the validity of the identification assumption.
1.4.2 Data
We use election data at the electoral section and the municipal level for all municipal
elections from 1994 to 2010 for which data is available as our main outcome vari-
able. 2 8 Prior to 1994, electoral figures were directly manipulated by the PRI through
vote fraud practices. The election data at the section level comes from the state elec-
toral institutes, which are responsible for conducting municipal and state governor
elections. The election data at the municipal level comes from several sources: the
Alain de Remes' 1980-1990 electoral data base, the BANAMEX-CIDAC's 1985-2010
electoral data base, and different state electoral institutes.
To compute the measure of fit used in our empirical analysis, we use geospatial
data on the location of the communal lands and the electoral sections in M6xico. The
electoral section data is from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The communal
land data comes from the Agrarian National Registry (RAN), which collected the data
during the rollout of Mexico's land certification program -the PROCEDE. The RAN
facilitated the spatial location of all communal lands that completed the certification
stage of the program or were in the process of certification by the end of 2006. The
sample includes more than 95% of the communal lands in Mexico.
To construct an indicator of whether the PRI controls the state government at the
time of the election, we used electoral data at the state level for all state gubernatorial
elections from 1985 to 2010. The source of this data is the BANAMEX-CIDAC's
1985-2010 electoral data base.
Finally, the data on other regressors of interest and policy outcomes come from
the 2007 Agricultural Census, several Population Censuses (1990 to 2010), and the
28The data at the municipality level is available for all elections.
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State and Municipal Data Base System (1994-2010). The source of all these data sets
is the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Preview of Results
Figure 1-5 show that communal lands with a larger fit exhibit a larger PRI vote share
only when the PRI controls the state government. Figure 1-5 shows two plots that
illustrate the relationship between the vote share for the PRI and communal land fit.
The plot on the left indicates the cases when the PRI controls the state government
and the plot on the right depicts the cases when it does not. As predicted by the
model, the left plot shows that communal lands with a larger fit exhibit a larger
electoral support for the PRI when it controls the state government. Additionally,
the right plots suggests that fit presents no clear association with the electoral support
for the PRI when another party is the incumbent.
Figure 1-6 illustrates the evolution of the vote share for the PRI over time for
the states that experience a change in state government control from the PRI to
another party. The data is divided into communal lands above and below the median
level of fit. As predicted, Figure 5 indicates that communal lands with a larger
fit exhibit a larger electoral support for the PRI only when it controls the state
government. Additionally, there are no differential trends in electoral support for the
PRI in communal lands with different fit. Hence, we could interpret our estimation
equation as a difference in differences where the changes in the party that controls
the state government are plausibly exogenous.
1.5.2 Results
Table 1.1 reports the results of our empirical specification that tests whether com-
munal lands with a larger fit exhibit a larger PRI vote share when the PRI controls
the state government. Column (1) presents the baseline specification in equation
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(1.22), column (2) includes spatial controls for the location of communal lands within
each state, column (3) introduces electoral section fixed effects, and column (4) adds
state-year fixed effects.
As predicted, all columns in Table 1.1 indicate that fit has a significant positive
effect on the PRI's vote share when the PRI controls the state government. As also
predicted by the model, columns (1) and (2) indicate that the effect of fit is indistin-
guishable from zero when another party controls the state government. The results
in column (4) suggest that, when the PRI is the incumbent party at the state govern-
ment level, a one standard deviation increase in fit corresponds to a 1.5 percentage
points (pp) increase in the vote share for the PRI. To interpret the importance of the
coefficient, note that 1.5 pp account for 19% of the 8 pp of incumbency advantage
that the PRI enjoys when it controls the state government. In addition, in 11% of
municipal elections, the winning margin is less than 1.5 pp.
The predictions of the model are supported by the results. While a larger fit leads
to a larger PRI vote share, the effect is only evident when the PRI controls the state
government.
1.5.3 Placebo
We conduct a placebo exercise to address any concerns that results might be driven
by omitted unobservable variables that correlate with PRI's electoral support. In our
placebo exercise, instead of considering the incumbency of the PRI in the state office,
we use its incumbency in the municipal office. PRI's control of the municipal gov-
ernment is correlated with PRI's electoral support but should not allow the PRI to
mobilize its clientelistic networks on communal lands. Commissariats have weak links
with municipal authorities (Hevia de la Jara (2010)) and municipal governments are
very weak relative to the state governments, which are responsible for the execution
of the bulk of public programs at the local level. Hence, if fit captures the varia-
tion in omitted unobservable variables that are correlated with the PRI's electoral
support, our placebo estimates should also be significantly positive. However, if our
identification assumption is valid, estimates should be zero.
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Table 1.2 replicates columns (1) to (4) in Table 1.1 and looks at the effect of fit
when the PRI controls the municipal government. Results support the validity of
our identification strategy. They indicate that a larger fit does not contribute to the
electoral support for the PRI when the PRI controls the municipal government at the
time of the election.
1.6 Aggregate Effects of Clientelism
We now turn to the aggregate effects of clientelism on electoral and policy outcomes.
Our goal in this section is twofold. First, we want to show that the presence of
clientelistic networks on communal lands has an aggregate effect on election outcomes.
This is particularly relevant since, e.g., a priori there could be a general equilibrium
interaction across places, and therefore, aggregate effects aren't just the aggregation
of the communal land-level results.29 Additionally, note that the effect we estimate
might not solely reflect the PRI's monitoring over its political brokers. 0
To identify the aggregate effect of clientelism on election outcomes, we look at
municipality level outcomes and exploit a difference in differences strategy where we
use private lands as a control group for communal lands. In doing this, we use the
fact that there is a larger presence of clientelistic networks operating in communal
lands than in private ones. Consequently, communal lands should exhibit a larger
electoral support for the PRI relative to private lands when the PRI controls the
state government.
Our second goal is to see whether the presence of clientelistic networks on com-
munal lands has aggregate effects on policy outcomes. In the model in Section 3 we
show that communal lands where clientelistic networks operate more extensively have
lower investments in public goods when the PRI controls the state government. The
intuition is that funding a political broker has a larger electoral return in communal
lands and, consequently, it crowds out the provision of public goods.
'
9We are currently exploring this theoretical possibility.
soUnfortunately, we cannot look at the interaction of the share of communal land with aggregatefit since we do not have enough variation in fit at the municipal level.
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To estimate the effect of clientelism on policy outcomes, we look at schooling
outcomes and use an identification strategy analogous to the one we use for the case
of the election outcomes. Schooling outcomes are an appropriate measure of public
good provision for two reasons. First, since the 1992 National Agreement for the
Modernization of Basic Education, states have been responsible for the administration
of basic education at the local level in Mexico (Helper et al. (2006), Santibaiez et al.
(2005)). Second, they represent an appropriate measure of public goods, since
exclusion is hard. Figure 1-7 illustrates that it is hard to exclude students from a
communal land or those close to a communal land from attending a nearby school.
1.6.1 Empirical strategy
Our baseline specification to test the aggregate effect of the presence of clientelistic
networks on communal lands on election and policy outcomes is the following:
Ymny = 00 +01 - I +,82 - I3 - clm, +,33 - IP - alm + (1.24)
04 -sy +06 cl, -svs+ 06 - alms - vs + 7m + 4sy + emsy (1.25)
where ymy is an outcome of interest in municipality m in state s in year y, IfRI is an
indicator of whether the PRI controls the state government at the time of the election,
clm, is the share of communal land area over the total area of a given municipality,
alms is the share of total agricultural land over the total area of a given municipality,
and v, is the vote share that the PRI obtained in the last state government election
by the year y. qm are municipality fixed effects, and hence, identification comes
from within variation in municipalities that experienced a change in the party that
3 1The majority of the financial resources still comes from the Federal Subsecretary of Basic Ed-
ucation (Subsecretarla de Educacin Bdsica - SEP). However, states do raise their own funds to
invest in new teachers or schools.
With respect to other potential outcomes for public goods, conversely, the public health system
is mostly administered by the federal government. Between the Mexican Social Security Institute
(Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social - IMSS) and the Institute for Social Security and Services for
State Workers (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado - ISSSTE),
the federal government provides health care coverage to most individuals. The IMSS and the ISSSTE
are federal government organizations that provide health care to workers in the private sector and
federal employees, respectively.
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controls the state government.3 2 4,, are either year dummies or state-year dummies
that control for national-level or state-level trends.3 3 Standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
#2 captures the effect of the PRI's control of the state government on municipalities
with a larger share of communal lands. We expect #2 > 0 when the outcome variable
is a measure of the PRI's electoral support, and #2 < 0 when the outcome variable is
a measure of schooling supply.
There is a concern that, in the case of the electoral outcomes, 32 might be cap-
turing reverse causality, i.e., that differential trends in the electoral support for the
PRI in communal lands drive party changes in the state government. This concern is
mitigated in the most robust specification that includes control for state-level trends.
This specification accounts for any differential trend in the electoral support for the
PRI in communal lands that is correlated with state-level trends. In addition, in
all specifications we control for the interaction between the state vote share that the
PRI obtained in the last state gubernatorial election and the municipal shares of both
communal and agricultural land. Further, we conduct a placebo analysis as we did
above.
1.6.2 Preview of Results on Election Outcomes
For a preview of the results, Figure 1-8 illustrates the vote share for the PRI over
time for the states that experience a change in state government control from the PRI
to another party. The data is divided into municipalities above and below median
level of communal land in the municipality. Figure 1-8 indicates no presence of
differential pretends between municipalities above and below the median municipal
level of communal land under PRI's state governments. Additionally, Figure 1-8
shows that municipalities above the median municipal level of communal land exhibit
a larger voter share for the PRI when the PRI controls the state government. However,
327/m control for municipality characteristics that are invariant over time, including the levels of
cim, and alms.
33When #,, are state-year dummies, ,fRI and v, 1 are absorbed.
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such a difference disappears the moment the PRI loses the state government.
1.6.3 Results on Election Outcomes
Table 1.3 reports the results of our empirical specification on election outcomes.
Columns (1) and (3) present the baseline specification as characterized in equation
(1.24), and columns (2) and (4) add state-year dummies. Columns (3) and (4) add
controls that capture municipal economic development.
As predicted, all columns in Table 1.3 indicate that a larger share of communal
lands has a significant positive effect on the PRI's vote share when the PRI controls
the state government. Results in column (2) indicate that the baseline result is robust
to the introduction of state-year fixed effects, which suggests that state-level trends
in support for the PRI are not driving the results. To interpret the importance of
the coefficients, the specification in column (4) suggests that, when the PRI controls
the state government, a one standard deviation increase in the share of communal
lands corresponds to a 2.6 pp increase in the vote share for the PRI in municipal
elections. Note that 2.6 pp account for 30% of the 8 pp of incumbency advantage
that the PRI enjoys when it controls the state government. In addition, in 18% of
municipal elections the winning margin is less than 2.6 pp.
To deal with the concern that communal lands are not only capturing the presence
of clientelistic networks but also potential differences in economic development that
correlate with electoral support for the PRI, columns (3) and (4) include a series
of controls that account for these potential differences. These consist of the share
of households with access to electricity, piped water and connection to drainage,
which are the measures of economic development that are consistently captured in
all censuses in Mexico. Results from columns (3) and (4) indicate that our findings
are robust.
We should note a caveat on the estimates we present in columns (3) and (4). The
model suggests that clientelism might result in a lower provision of public goods.
Consequently, when we include controls that capture economic development, we con-
trol for outcome variables, which is a strategy that delivers unidentified estimates
41
(Angrist and Pischke (2009)). Thus, we provide estimates in columns (3) and (4) for
robustness but do not consider them the most preferred specification.
Table 1.4 replicates the estimates from Table 1.3 using an indicator of PRI winning
the municipal election as an outcome instead, and has similar implications. Overall,
the findings in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 support that municipalities with a larger share
of communal lands exhibit larger electoral support for the PRI when the PRI controls
the state government.
To address the reverse causality concern, we conduct a placebo test using the
incumbency of the PRI in the municipal office instead of its incumbency in the state
office. Results in Table 1.5 indicate that municipalities with a larger share of com-
munal lands do not present differential electoral support for the PRI when the PRI
controls the municipal government.
Note that municipalities with a larger share of agricultural lands, which include
both communal and private lands, exhibit a lower vote share for the PRI when the
PRI controls the municipal government. This phenomenon simply reflects the down-
ward trend we observe in Figure 1-8. During the period we study, there is a significant
decrease in the support for the PRI. The reason this decrease is larger for municipal-
ities with a larger share of agricultural lands is that urban areas were the first ones
to turn against the PRI in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
1.6.4 Results on Policy Outcomes
Table 1.6 reports the results on schooling supply outcomes. Odd columns present
the baseline specification, as characterized in equation (1.24), and even columns add
state-year dummies. In the first two columns, the outcome is the number of primary
and secondary schools per 1,000 inhabitants. The outcome in columns (3) and (4) is
the number of primary and secondary teachers per 1,000 inhabitants. In the last two
columns, the outcome is the number of students that attend primary and secondary
schools per 1,000 inhabitants.3 4
34The number of students is not necessarily indicative of the quality of the education supply.
However, a lower number of students enrolled per capita confirms the effect of a worse schooling
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Overall, the estimates in Table 1.6 suggest that municipalities that have a larger
share of communal lands have a significantly lower educational supply when the PRI
is the party in the state government. Results in column (2) indicate that, when
the PRI is the incumbent party, a one standard deviation increase in the share of
communal lands corresponds to a 3.93 percentage drop in the number of primary and
secondary schools relative to the sample mean. The third column shows that one
standard deviation more in the share of communal lands is associated with a 3.09
percentage decrease in the number of primary and secondary schools relative to the
sample mean, if the PRI is in power. Estimates in column (5) imply that, when the
PRI controls the state government, a one standard deviation increase in the share of
communal lands denotes a 2.24 percentage drop in the number of students enrolled in
primary and secondary schools relative to the sample mean. These results are robust
to introducing state-year fixed effects.
To address the worry that communal lands are not only capturing the presence of
clientelistic networks but also differences in economic development, Table 1.7 controls
for the economic development of the municipalities. Results are robust to adding these
controls.
Overall, the findings in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 support that municipalities with a
larger share of communal lands exhibit a reduced provision of public goods - measured
by schooling supply - when the PRI controls the state government.
Finally, our placebo estimates in Table 1.8 indicate that municipalities with a
larger share of communal lands do not present differences in schooling outcomes when
the PRI is in office at the municipal level.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we make two contributions to our understanding of how clientelistic
transactions prevail in a secret ballot context, and the effect of clientelism on electoral
supply measured by the two other outcome variables. The results do not change when primary and
secondary education are consider separately.
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and policy outcomes. Our main contribution is to provide empirical evidence that
suggests that the PRI uses electoral results to monitor political brokers to make sure
they deliver the votes of its clientelistic networks.
Exploiting plausibly exogenous differences in the fit between communal lands and
electoral sections that facilitate the PRI's supervision of its brokers, we show that
communal lands with a larger fit, which enable better PRI's monitoring capacity,
exhibit a larger electoral support for the PRI. This phenomenon only happens when
the PRI controls the state government, and consequently, the resources necessary
to fund and incentivize its brokers. While the direct evidence on the monitoring of
brokers by the PRI is from the field work, the empirical findings are consistent with
these observations. There seems to be no other explanations that would account for
these empirical findings.
Second, we show that, when the PRI controls the state government, municipal-
ities with a larger share of communal lands exhibit an increased vote share for the
PRI and a lower provision of public goods, measured by schooling supply. We use
a difference in differences strategy where we compare municipalities with different
shares of communal lands while controlling for the share of agricultural land, which
includes communal and privates lands. Results are not driven by differential pre-
trends or difference in the economic development of communal and private lands.
Our second contribution provides empirical support to the literature that argues that
clientelism undermines democracy and economic development (Keefer 2007, Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007, Lyne 2007).
These results have several policy implications. Naturally, there is the need to clar-
ify and strengthen the operation rules of social programs. The lack of transparency
of the rules contributes significantly to the manipulation of programs for clientelistic
purposes in Mexico (Martinez 2010). Out of the federal and state programs registered
in the Initiative for the Strengthening of the Institutionalization of the Social Pro-
grams in Mexico (IPRO), 21% lack operation rules, 27% have no beneficiary list, 40%
have a beneficiary list but it is not public, 27% have no criteria to select beneficiaries,
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and 32% have no evaluation mechanisms.3 5 Additionally, there might be scope for a
demarcation of electoral sections that minimizes the capacity of parties to monitor
its political brokers. Further, in case such a demarcation was not possible, since our
findings identify the locations where clientelistic exchanges are more likely to prevail,
they can be used to target the areas where to focus to crack down on clientelistic
practices.
In future work, to provide further evidence of the effect of the monitoring of
brokers by the PRI on election and policy outcomes, we will look at the effect of fit
on turnout at the electoral section level, and the allocation of social programs and
schooling supply at the communal land level. We have already requested turnout
data to the IFE, data on allocation of social programs to the Secretariat of Social
Development, and data on the location and opening date of all primary and secondary
schools in the whole of Mexico to the Secretariat of Public Education.
3 IPRO is a website where federal and state governments can voluntarily register the social pro-
grams they are executing. http://www.programassociales.org.mx/
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Appendix A: Fieldwork and Popular Press Evidence
I conducted fieldwork in June 2012, the month prior to the presidential election, in
twelve municipalities of four Mexican states: M6xico, Morelos, Puebla and Tlaxcala.
On average I interviewed three commissariats or former commissariats (in case of
short tenure of the current one) and two peasants in each municipality. In addition,
I complemented the fieldwork evidence with qualitative evidence from the Mexican
press to give a broader view of these issues across the whole of Mexico.
Here there are some anecdotal evidence excerpts from the fieldwork and the popu-
lar press, which provide supporting evidence on the presence of the PRI's clientelistic
practices in communal lands in the states under PRI control.
On the importance of the alignment of communal lands and commis-
sariats to the PRI to receive assistance from PRI state governments:
In the state of Mexico, a commissariat stated, "the PRI government listens to
everybody equally but, logically, it does not give the same support to everybody; it
supports its people more."
In the state of M6xico, another commissariat affirmed, "it is easier for a commis-
sariat to get support from people from his own party since, if they are not from his
party, they put a series of obstacles in his way."
After a flood in the state of Tabasco, the PRI's state government delivered aid
to its supporters in communal lands under the threat that they would no longer
get any help if they did not attend rallies and vote for the PRI's candidate in the
upcoming election. The community from the ejido Las Coloradas in the municipality
of Cardenas, also affected by floods, did not receive any aid since it had historically
voted for the PRD (Reforma (2000)).
A commissariat explained, "when the PRI was in government, the conditioning
was a serious problem. If we voted for the PRI, there was aid, if we did not, we were
marginalized. With the change in government, everything is more flexible; people can
vote for the party they want and the aid will still come."
On the conditioning of aid within communal lands by commissariats in
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PRI states:
When asked about the distribution of the resources that come to the ejido, a
commissariat mentioned, "most people support the PRI, those that do not vote for
the PRI are excluded; they clearly know they cannot get anything from me."
Several peasants hinted that government aid only makes it to the party supporters
within the ejido.
After a flood in the state of Tabasco, a peasant from the ejido Rafael Martinez
de Escobar in the municipality of Huimanguillo complained that the government
promised him relief but that the commissariat informed him that "by the instruction
of the state government, assistance is only given to PRI's supporters" (Mari (2001)).
On the PRI's work to control commissariats:
In the last election for commissariat in largest ejido in the state of Puebla, the
exiting commissariat and the PRI's municipal president were charged with fraud to
facilitate a win by the PRI candidate. Witnesses argue that the commissariat, illegally
assisted by the municipal president, issued a number of permits to represent absent
peasants that exceeded the number agreed upon by the candidates before the election.
The municipal president also contributed to the issuing of such permits even though
by regulation the commissariat is the only one entitled to do so. Also, in the course
of the election they allowed peasants that did not belong to the ejido to vote. Dead
people also appeared on the list of voters of the election. The tenure of the elected
commissariat is about to end and the decision of the agrarian tribunal that has to
rule on the validity of the election is still pending. Copies of the witnesses declaration
to the agrarian tribunal are available upon request.
The former commissariat of the ejido El Quemado in the municipality of G6mez
Palacio in the state of Durango was accused of vote buying and other irregularities in
the elections to pick his successor. He, also a state legislator of the PRI, was alleged
to have paid 3,000 pesos ($230) for each vote and to allow peasants that were not
part of the ejido to vote (Acosta 2009).
On the CNC:
Commissariats and peasant in the state of Mexico report assistance from the CNC.
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Peasants from communal lands in the states of Michoacan and Nayarit acknowl-
edge that the PRI and the CNC use them for electoral purposes but claim that it is
the only way they can get some support when they are in power (Reforma (2005)).
On the eve of the gubernatorial elections in the state of Oaxaca, it was reported
that the PRI distributed 50 tons of fertilizers to the peasants of the ejido 20 de
Noviembre that were affiliated with the CNC (Garcia et al. 2004).
A commissariat in the state of Puebla mentioned, "the CNC was here when the
PRI was in the government. With the change in government, it is no longer present."
A commissariat from the state of Morelos pointed out, "the CNC fell with the
PRI government because the assistance is ultimately from programs that belong to
the state and federal governments."
When the PRI recovered the state governorship in 2011 in the state of Tlaxcala,
the president of the CNC in this state acknowledged that the peasant organization
had lost presence in the state as a result of the political rivalry with the past two
state governments. However, he asserted that he trusted that the organization would
be able to recover its strength with the return of the PRI to the state government
(Osorno Xochipa (2011)).
A commissariats of the state of Tlaxcala indicated, "the CNC has disappeared
for a long time but it is now coming back with the return of the PRI to the state
government."
Another commissariat from the state of Tlaxcala stated "I do not support the
PRI but, if the CNC returns, we will have to support the PRI so that we get help."
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Appendix B: Derivation of Estimation Equation
The vote share for the PRI in electoral section e in municipality m in state s in year
t can be decomposed as follows
lre,m,s,t = ae,m,s rc,e,m,s,t ± (1 - ae,m,s) - Wnc,e,m,s,t (1.26)
where ae,m,s is the share of voters from communal lands in the electoral section, and
WC,e,m,s,t and lrnc,e,m,s,t are the vote shares for the PRI of the communal land voters
and the non-communal land voters, respectively. In turn,
7rc'e~ms,t = Pci'e'm'8 - 7rcilm'S't (1.27)
where Pci,e,m,s is the share of voters from communal lands in the electoral section that
come from communal land ci and Wree,m,s,t is the vote share for the PRI of the voters
that come from communal land ci. Replacing 7rc1,m,s,t with (1.21), and 7 rnc,e,m,s,t with
7nc,e,m,s,t = /0 + #1,nc - IStRI + nc + Ernc,e,m,s,t (1.28)
it follows that
7re,m,s,t = #0 + 1 - IS/'t + #2 - fite,m,s + 3 fite,m,s - IJ + U7e,m,s + se,m,s,t (1.29)
where fite,m,s = ae,m,s - Ei Pci,e,m,s - fitci,m,s -
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Appendix C: Figures and Tables
Figure 1-1: Distribution of communal lands in M6xico
Note: State boundaries are in black, communal lands in green, and non-communal
land areas in white.
50
(a) Ocampo in Coahuila state
(b) Del Nayar in Nayarit state
Figure 1-2: Examples of the variation in the correspondence
and electoral sections from Coahuila and Nayarit states
between communal lands
Note: The figures illustrate the variation in the correspondence between communal
lands and electoral sections. Municipal boundaries are in black, electoral sections in
dotted blue, communal lands in green, and non-communal land areas in green.
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(a) Concepcion del Oro Mazapil, and Melchor Ocampo
in Zacatecas state
(b) Tierra Blanca in Veracruz state
Figure 1-3: Examples of the variation in the correspondence between communal lands
and electoral sections from Veracruz and Zacatecas states
Note: The figures illustrate the variation in the correspondence between communal
lands and electoral sections. Municipal boundaries are in black, electoral sections in
dotted blue, communal lands in green, and non-communal land areas in green.
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Case a Case b
Figure 1-4: Examples of communal land fit
Note: The fit of a communal land is the weighted average proportion of communal
land voters in the electoral sections where they vote. In Case a almost exclusively
peasants of the communal land vote in the electoral section overlapping with the
communal land, and hence, the communal land has a large fit. In Case b communal
land peasants vote together with a significant amount of individuals from outside the
communal land, and therefore, the communal land has a small fit.
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PRI's Vote Share and Fit under PRI Governor
-2 .4 .6Communal Land Fit
PRIs Vote Share and Fit under Non-PRI Governor
.2 C4 6Communal Land Fit
Figure 1-5: The relationship between communal land
under PRI and non-PRI governors
.8 1
fit and the PRI's vote share
Note: The PRI's vote share in municipal elections is on the y-axis and the communal
land fit on the x-axis. The left figure indicates the case when the PRI controls the
state government and the right figure when it does not.
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Communal Land and the Vote Share for the PRI
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High Communal Land Municipality
Low Communal Land Municipality
Figure 1-6: The effect of high and low fit on the PRI's vote share under PRI and
non-PRI governors
Note: The PRI's vote share in municipal elections is on the y-axis and the election
since the change from the PRI in state governent is on the x-axis. The data is
divided into communal lands above and below the median level of fit. The year when
the change took place is normalized to zero and indicated with a red vertical line.
Thus, elections during the PRI's state governments take negative values and elections
during state governments of other parties take positive values. By construction, only
municipalities that experienced a change in party at the state government level are
included in the plot.
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Municipaiies Electoal Sections CommunalLands [ Pr may Schods 5 10 20 ies
Figure 1-7: Example of the location of schools
Note: The figure illustrates that primary schools are non-excludable. Municipal
boundaries are in black, electoral sections in dotted blue, communal lands in green,
non-communal land areas are in white, and primary schools yellow squares.
56
CD
06
C
&-
Communal Land and the Vote Share for the PRI
-4edons -nce3 - 0 1 2 3 4
ange from the PRI In State Government
High Communal Land Municipality
Low Communal Land Municipality
Figure 1-8: The effect of high and low communal land on the PRI's vote share under
PRI and non-PRI governors
Note: The PRI's vote share in municipal elections is on the y axis and the election
since the change from the PRI in state government is on the x axis. The data is
divided into municipalities above and below median level of communal land in the
municipality. The year when the change took place is normalized to zero and indicated
with a red vertical line. Thus, elections during the PRI's state governments take
negative values and elections during state governments of other parties take positive
values. By construction, only municipalities that experienced a change in party at
the state government level are included in the plot.
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Table 1.1: The effect of fit on the PRI's vote share in municipal elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRI's Governor .1214*** .1259*** .1723***
[.0422] [.0423] [.0556]
Fit 
-0.0047 -0.0067
[.0229] [.0243]
PRI's Governor * Fit .0808*** .0859*** .1249** 0.0717*
[.0289] [.0291] [.0486] [.0426]
Effect (pp) 1.71 1.82 2.64 1.52
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Electoral Section Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Spatial controls Yes
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes
Mean Outcome 0.5045 0.5045 0.5045 0.5045
Mean Fit 0.4235 0.4235 0.4235 0.4235
Standard Deviation Fit 0.2115 0.2115 0.2115 0.2115
Observations 133943 133943 133943 133943
R-squared 0.2808 0.2883 0.5062 0.567
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is the electoral section, we include
year fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors at the state level. Also we control for
the area, number of registered voters and communal land share, and their interactions
with PRI's Governor. Fit is the area weighted average of the communal land fit of the
communal lands that overlap with the electoral section, times the share of the electoral
section that overlaps with communal lands. The communal land fit captures the area
weighted average share of each section that overlaps with the communal land. Spatial
controls include flexible polynomials of latitude and longitude of the centroid of each
electoral section interacted with state dummies. Effect is the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in fit. pp indicates percentage points. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 1.2: Placebo on the effect of fit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRI's Mayor 0.0142 0.0115 .0546** .0461**
[.0238] [.0241) [.01991 [.0202
Fit 0.0018 0.0047
[.0175] [.0175]
PRI's Mayor * Fit 0.0104 0.009 0.0149 0.0139
[.0165] [.0163) [.0125] [.013]
Effect (pp) 0.22 0.19 0.32 0.29
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes
Electoral fixed effects Yes Yes
Spatial controls Yes
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes
Mean Outcome 0.5044 0.5044 0.5044 0.5044
Mean Fit 0.4236 0.4236 0.4236 0.4236
Standard Deviation Fit 0.2115 0.2115 0.2115 0.2115
Observations 133730 133730 133730 133730
R-squared 0.2824 0.2893 0.2813 0.3467
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is the electoral section, we include
year fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors at the state level. Also we control for
the area, number of registered voters and communal land share, and their interactions
with PRI's Mayor. Fit is the area weighted average of the communal land fit of the
communal lands that overlap with the electoral section, times the share of the electoral
section that overlaps with communal lands. The communal land fit captures the area
weighted average share of each section that overlaps with the communal land. Spatial
controls include flexible polynomials of latitude and longitude of the centroid of each
electoral section interacted with state dummies. Effect is the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in fit. pp indicates percentage points. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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municipal electionson the PRI's vote share in
Table 1.3: Difference in differences estimates of the effect of a PRI governor on the
PRI's vote share in municipal elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRI's Governor -0.0214 0.0369
[.0264] [.1576]
Communal Land * PRI's Governor .1565** .1409*** .1507** .1405***
[.061] [.0376] [.0616] [.0459]
Agricultural Land * PRI's Governor -0.0067 -0.0473 -0.0053 -0.0425
[.0462] [.0466 [.0416] [.0412]
Effect (pp) 5.34 4.81 5.14 4.80
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Controls for Economic Development
Mean of Ouctome
Mean of Communal Land
Standard Deviation of Communal Land
Mean of Agricultural Land
Standard Deviation of Agricultural Land
Observations
R - squared
0.541
0.2333
0.1847
0.5249
0.2837
13902
0.5603
0.541
0.2333
0.1847
0.5249
0.2837
13902
0.6577
Yes
0.5408
0.2332
0.1846
0.5252
0.2837
13855
0.5709
Yes
0.5408
0.2332
0.1846
0.5252
0.2837
13855
0.6641
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is a municipality, we include munici-
pality and year fixed effects and we cluster standard errors at the state level. Controls
for economic development include the share of households with access to electricity,
piped water and connection to drainage, and their interaction with a dummy that indi-
cates a PRI governor at the time of the election. Effect is the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in share of communal land. pp indicates percentage points. * p<.1,
** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 1.4: Difference in differences estimates of the effect of a PRI governor on
whether the PRI wins in municipal elections
(1) (3) (2) (4)
PRI's Governor -0.0811 -0.1106
[.1195] [.5689]
Communal Land * PRI's Governor .4844* .3658* .4436* .392*
[.246] [.2053] [.2467] [.2272]
Agricultural Land * PRI's Governor -0.0025 -0.1809 -0.0058 -0.1926
[.1214] [.1592] [.1237] [.1754]
Effect (pp) 15.54 11.73 14.23 12.57
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Controls for Economic Development Yes Yes
Mean of Ouctome 0.5759 0.5759 0.5756 0.5756
Mean of Communal Land 0.2333 0.2333 0.2332 0.2332
Standard Deviation of Communal Land 0.1847 0.1847 0.1846 0.1846
Mean of Agricultural Land 0.5249 0.5249 0.5252 0.5252
Standard Deviation of Agricultural Land 0.2837 0.2837 0.2837 0.2837
Observations 13902 13902 13855 13855
R - squared 0.3481 0.4661 0.3539 0.4692
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is a municipality, we include munici-
pality and year fixed effects and we cluster standard errors at the state level. Controls
for economic development include the share of households with access to electricity,
piped water and connection to drainage, and their interaction with a dummy that indi-
cates a PRI governor at the time of the election. Effect is the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in share of communal land. pp indicates percentage points. * p<.1,
** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 1.5: Difference in differences estimates of the effect a PRI mayor on the PRI's
vote share in municipal elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PRI's Mayor 0.006 0.0142
[.0215] [.1156]
Communal Land * PRI's Mayor -0.0076 -0.0064 -0.0137 -0.0301
[.0328] [.0227] [.0288] [.0229]
Agricultural Land * PRI's Mayor -.0584* -.0462*** -.0608** -.0733***
[.0298] [.0125] [.0283] [.0182]
Effect (pp) 
-0.14 -0.12 -0.25 -0.56
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Controls for Economic Development Yes Yes
Mean of Ouctome 0.5409 0.5409 0.5407 0.5407
Mean of Communal Land 0.2333 0.2333 0.2331 0.2331
Standard Deviation of Communal Land 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846
Mean of Agricultural Land 0.5248 0.5248 0.525 0.525
Standard Deviation of Agricultural Land 0.2837 0.2837 0.2837 0.2837
Observations 13822 13822 13779 13779
R - squared 0.5648 0.6608 0.5728 0.6674
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is a municipality, we include munici-
pality and year fixed effects and we cluster standard errors at the state level. Controls
for economic development include the share of households with access to electricity,
piped water and connection to drainage, and their interaction with a dummy that indi-
cates a PRI governor at the time of the election. Effect is the impact of a one standard
deviation increase in share of communal land. pp indicates percentage points. * p<.1,
** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 1.6: Difference in differences estimates of the effect of a PRI governor on educational outcomes
Outcomes Schools Schools Teachers Teachers Students Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRI's Governor 0.0195 .4327** 7.904
[.0236] [.1937] [6.497]
Communal Land * PRI's Gov. -.2649*** -.2857*** -1.362*** -.9697*** -32.78*** -25.08***
[.0569] [.0741) [.3992) [.3555] [11.8] [9.673]
Agricultural Land * PRI's Gov. 0.0222 0.0821 -0.1248 0.2694 2.821 14.18
[.0416] [.0605] [.28271 [.3395] [9.317] [9.215]
Effect(%) 3.93 4.24 3.09 2.20 3.24 2.48
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean Ouctome 1.276 1.276 8.343 8.343 191.6 191.6
Mean Communal Land 0.234 0.234 0.2339 0.2339 0.2334 0.2334
Standard Deviation Com. Land 0.1894 0.1894 0.1892 0.1892 0.1891 0.1891
Mean Agricultural Land 0.5272 0.5272 0.5272 0.5272 0.5264 0.5264
Standard Deviation Agr. Land 0.2861 0.2861 0.2857 0.2857 0.2862 0.2862
Observations 32663 32663 32781 32781 33015 33015
R - squared 0.9807 0.9828 0.9111 0.9346 0.8018 0.832
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is a municipality, we include municipality and year fixed effects and we cluster
standard errors at the municipal level. Schools, Teachers and Students indicate the number per 1,000 inhabitants. Controls for
economic development include the share of households with access to electricity, piped water and connection to drainage, and their
interaction with a dummy that indicates a PRI governor at the time of the election. Effect is the impact of a one standard deviation
increase in share of communal land over the mean of the outcome variable. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 1.7: Difference in differences estimates
of economics development
of the effect of a PRI governor on educational outcomes controlling for covariates
Outcomes Schools Schools Teachers Teachers Students Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRI Governor -0.3929 -1.743 -55.87**
[.4829] [1.1061 [23.77]
Communal Land * PRI's Gov. -.1648*** -.2195*** -1.204*** -.8139** -30.32*** -21.29**
[.0533] [.0713] [.3827] [.3512] [11.01] [9.46]
Agricultural Land * PRI's Gov. -0.001 0.0483 -0.1899 0.1254 0.8899 9.231
[.0402] [.0572] [.2803] [.3431] [9.294] [9.294]
Effect (%) 2.45 3.26 2.73 1.85 2.99 2.10
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Economic Dev. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Ouctome 1.276 1.276 8.343 8.343 191.6 191.6
Mean Communal Land 0.234 0.234 0.2339 0.2339 0.2334 0.2334
Standard Deviation Com. Land 0.1894 0.1894 0.1892 0.1892 0.1891 0.1891
Mean Agricultural Land 0.5272 0.5272 0.5272 0.5272 0.5265 0.5265
Standard Deviation Agr. Land 0.2861 0.2861 0.2857 0.2857 0.2862 0.2862
Observations 32619 32619 32737 32737 32972 32972
R - squared 0.9809 0.9829 0.9114 0.9349 0.803 0.8331
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is a municipality, we include municipality and year fixed effects and we cluster
standard errors at the municipal level. Schools, Teachers and Students are per 1,000 inhabitants. Controls for economic development
include the share of households with access to electricity, piped water and connection to drainage, and their interaction with a
dummy that indicates a PRI governor at the time of the election. Effect is the impact of a one standard deviation increase in share
of communal land over the mean of the outcome variable. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 1.8: Difference in differences estimates of the effect of a PRI mayor on educational outcomes
Outcomes Schools Schools Teachers Teachers Students Students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Communal Land * PRI Mayor 0.0013 -0.0046 -0.0941 -0.1239 -2.564 -3.928
[.0377] [.0371] [.2112] [.2086] [5.266] [5.258]
Agricultural Land * PRI Mayor 0.0245 0.0294 0.1381 0.1206 3.251 2.962
[.0216] [.0252] [.121] [.1362] [2.957] [3.252]
Effect (%) 0.02 -0.07 -0.21 -0.27 -0.25 -0.38
State - Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Economic Development Yes Yes Yes
Mean Ouctome 1.267 1.266 8.321 8.322 191.3 191.3
Mean Communal Land 0.2342 0.2342 0.2342 0.2341 0.2337 0.2336
Standard Deviation Communal Land 0.1843 0.1843 0.1842 0.1841 0.1841 0.1841
Mean Agricultural Land 0.5283 0.5284 0.5283 0.5284 0.5275 0.5276
Standard Deviation Land 0.2829 0.2829 0.2825 0.2826 0.2831 0.2831
Observations 30013 29964 30130 30081 30364 30315
R - squared 0.9826 0.9831 0.9334 0.9349 0.8287 0.8303
Note: In all specifications, the unit of observation is a municipality, we include municipality and year fixed effects and we cluster
standard errors at the municipal level. Schools, Teachers and Students are per 1,000 inhabitants. Controls for economic development
include the share of households with access to electricity, piped water and connection to drainage, and their interaction with PRI
mayor. Effect is the impact of a one standard deviation increase in share of communal land over the mean of the outcome variable.
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Chapter 2
The Role of Media Networks in
Compensating Political Biases:
Evidence from Radio Networks in
Brazil
2.1 Introduction
A central question in political economy is how to incentivize elected officials to al-
locate resources to those that need them the most. Theoretical work shows that
politicians might distort the allocation of funds to increase the likelihood of remain-
ing in office (Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Larreguy (2013)). A common example occurs
in the allocation of federal grants. Extensive evidence points out that central gov-
ernments often favor political allies and/or distribute fewer resources to non-aligned
constituencies (Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006), Arulampalam et al. (2009), Berry
et al. (2010), Brollo and Nannicini (2012)). Additionally, the literature shows that
media presence is instrumental in holding politicians accountable and promoting a
better allocation of public funds (Besley and Burgess (2002), Stromberg (2004), Sny-
der and Stromberg (2010), Bruns and Himmler (2011), Costas-Perez et al. (2011)).
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We study the interaction of these two phenomena by analyzing the role of the media
in compensating political biases. In particular, we analyze how media presence, con-
nectivity and ownership affect the distribution of federal drought relief transfers to
Brazilian municipalities.
The allocation of federal transfers for disaster relief in Brazil offers an interesting
setting to analyze this question as it is subject to significant red tape, and therefore
to political discretion. There is no automatic rule that determines that municipalities
should receive support in the event of a natural disaster. Instead, municipalities need
to request aid from the federal government and provide extensive documentation to
prove that they have been severely affected by a disaster and do not have the financial
ability to deal with it. This bureaucratic process allows the federal government to
support allies and/or withhold assistance from non-allies.
In Brazil voters receive information about disasters and the responsiveness of the
federal government to the disasters from the media. Local and regional issues are
usually discussed by commercial radio stations, which broadcast the bulk of local
news in Brazilian municipalities. Most radio stations are independent and just reach
a local audience but a share of them are connected to regional networks. These radio
stations are connected to a central station that collects and organizes information,
which it then distributes by satellite to local stations. Therefore, a radio station that
is connected to a network can both receive information about other places and add
content that is considered relevant to a larger regional audience. We study how the
presence of a network-connected radio station affects federal disaster relief response
through its ability to spread local news to a larger audience.
To guide the empirical analysis, we develop a simple model in which a federal
government decides how much disaster relief support it allocates to a municipality that
experiences a drought, based on its own electoral incentives and on the opportunity
cost of providing these funds. The effective aid an affected municipality receives
depends on the funds it gets and the ability of the federal government to manage
the drought aid. Voters learn about the federal government's performance, infer the
ability of the party that controls the government, and decide whether to reelect or
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replace it by another party. Voters rely on radio stations to acquire information
about the federal government's performance. While local and network-connected
radio stations spread this information to voters in the affected municipality, the radio
stations connected to a network are also able to disseminate it to unaffected voters.
The model characterization shows that, to maximize its electoral chances, the
federal government favors aligned constituencies, whose vote are more responsive to
the federal government's performance. However, the model predicts that, while the
presence of both local and network-connected radio stations increase the probability
non-allies receive federal support, the radio stations connected to a network have a
bigger effect than the local radio stations. Additionally, the model predicts that the
effect of network-connected radio stations increases with the extent of their network
coverage and the share of the federal government supporters reached by their news.
We test the model's predictions by investigating how non-alignment to the federal
government and media presence affects the probability of receiving federal support
conditional on experiencing low rainfall. Our main outcome variable is an indicator
of whether the federal government declares a municipal state of emergency, which is a
necessary condition for a municipality to receive federal support.' Our identification
strategy relies on the plausibly exogenous levels of precipitation and the identity of
the winning party in close municipal elections. The rainfall a given municipality
experiences over the period under analysis varies, and the lower the amount, the
higher the likelihood that the municipality receives federal support upon request.
Changes in municipal alignment to the federal government take place every two years
due to the timing of municipal and federal elections. Additionally, we exploit variation
in the presence of local and network-connected radio stations across municipalities. 2
Our core results are as follows. First, we find that municipalities that are not
aligned to the federal government have a lower probability of receiving relief funds
conditional on experiencing low precipitation. Second, we show that the presence of
a radio station compensates for this bias. Third, we provide evidence that this effect
IData on the actual transfers is not available.
2While several radio stations were established throughout Brazil during our period of analysis,
there is little within municipal variation in local and network-connected radio stations.
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is driven by municipalities that have radio stations connected to a regional network
rather than by the presence of local radio stations. Fourth, we show that television
stations, which are generally connected to a national or regional network, have no
effect. Fifth, we show that the effect of network-connected radio stations increases
with their network coverage. Sixth, we show that it is unlikely that our findings are
explained by differences in municipal economic development and financial capacity,
or by the ownership and manipulation of media outlets by politicians.
Our findings suggest that it is indeed the case that the federal government is biased
against non-aligned municipalities when it comes to the distribution of drought relief
aid. However, as predicted by our model, the presence of a radio station connected to
a network compensates for such a bias. Importantly, the effect of a network-connected
radio station operates by increasing the accountability of the federal government to-
wards the voters unaffected by the drought. Radio networks spread information about
droughts and the responsiveness of the federal government to the voters outside the
affected municipalities, thereby increasing the electoral costs of non-responsiveness.
On the contrary, since local radio stations do not belong to a network and network-
connected televisions stations do not affect the content transmitted by their network,
they have no effect.
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the strategic allocation of
resources by central governments who aim to maximize their electoral support. A
large body of work points out that the allocation of central transfers favors aligned
constituencies in Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini (2012)), India (Arulampalam et al.
(2009)), Portugal (Veiga and Pinho (2007)), Spain (Sole-Oll6 and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008)), and the United States (Berry et al. (2010)). Our paper similarly shows that
electoral motives play a role in the allocation of disaster relief transfers in Brazil, but
we also show how media can compensate for the central government's bias against
non-aligned municipalities.
The idea that it is more costly for politicians to neglect voters with access to
information about their performance via the media has been highlighted by earlier
work. Stromberg (2004) analyzes radio expansion in the United States during the
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1920s-1940s and shows that counties with more radio listeners received more New
Deal relief funds. Besley and Burgess (2002) find that Indian state governments'
provision of public food and calamity relief aid is more responsive to declines in food
production and crop flood damage in states where newspaper circulation is high.
Our paper also provides evidence that supports the importance of the role of media
in political accountability. However, our focus is on the role of the media network
in the diffusion of politically relevant information for the enhancement of political
accountability.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide back-
ground information on the disaster relief policy and the media market in Brazil. In
section 3, we develop a simple model that later guides the empirical analysis. In
section 4, we present the data and the empirical analysis. In section 5, we shows our
main results, present evidence on the mechanism that explains the effect of media,
and discuss alternative explanations. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Disaster Relief Policy
A central responsibility of the National Civilian Defense and Emergency System,
managed by the Ministry of National Integration, is to support local governments in
dealing with the consequences of natural disasters. In the event of a drought, this
support includes the supply of water trucks, food distribution, and temporary cash
transfers ("bolsa estiagem").3 Municipalities only receive this support if they request
and obtain a declaration of a state of emergency by the federal government.
The process to obtain a declaration of a state of emergency is subject to significant
red tape, which allows for discretion by the federal government. To get a declaration
of a state of emergency, a municipality has to send the federal government documents
that prove the severity of the disaster and their lack of financial ability to deal with
3The federal government may also allow farmers to renegotiate agriculture debts or redeem agri-
culture insurance.
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it. These documents encompass information on the characteristics of the disaster, the
affected area, the affected population, the estimated losses, the municipality budget,
and the measures adopted by the municipal and state governments (CEPED (2012)).4
Because of the bureaucratic nature of the emergency declaration process, there are
several ways through which the federal government can aid allies and withhold help
to non-allies. While the federal government can expedite a declaration of emergency
and approve it before even analyzing the documentation, it can also delay the process
by requiring additional information, or even deny assistance by claiming that the
municipal government has enough financial capacity to deal with the consequences of
the drought.
The popular press provides several examples of the political discretion that takes
place in the emergency declaration process. On February 17th, 2012, an article in
Globo Newspaper revealed that federal auditors found evidence that the Minister
of National Integration authorized relief transfers to several municipalities before
having a technical report that quantified the damage and the resources necessary
for reparations. This decision benefited six municipalities in Bahia, the state of the
Minister. In addition, four of the municipalities were controlled either by the federal
government's party or by the Minister's party.5 The federal auditors found notes
indicating that the technical reports should be filed with dates that preceded the
authorization of transfers. The federal auditors claimed that the understaffing of the
Ministry of National Integration facilitated the discretion in the allocation of public
funds.
2.2.2 Media in Brazil
Radio stations broadcast the bulk of local news in Brazilian municipalities. In 2008,
there were 3,445 commercial radio stations distributed across 1,970 (out of 5565)
4 1n addition, the mayor can enact a decree declaring state of calamity at the municipal level,
which also allows the municipality to expedite municipal procurement.
5The decision benefited Cairu (R$ 1,2 million), Lauro de Freitas (R$ 7 millions), Mascote (R$
600 k), Valenca (R$ 700k), Conde (R$ 1 million) and Simoes Filho (R$ 1 million).
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municipalities.6 Most radio stations are independent and just reach a local audience
but about 410 (12%) are connected to a regional radio network. The radio stations
connected to a network are commonly controlled by a central station or owned by a
regional or national group (Gorgen (2002)). The central station transmits information
on national and regional issues to local stations and receives information from them
on local issues that are relevant for a wider audience.
The example of Emissora Rural helps to illustrate how network-connected radio
stations operate.7 Emissora Rural is connected to Rede Cat6licas de Radio (Catholic
Radio Network), which is present in 150 municipalities across 5 states. Emissora Rural
obtains journalistic information about national and international issues through the
Rede Cat6licas de Radio, which provides around 10% of the content it broadcasts.
In addition, Emissora Rural informs the central station about local issues, which, in
turn, the central station retransmits to other connected stations.
The capacity of network-connected radio stations to receive and transmit content
differentiates them from other types of media. Local radio stations that are not
connected to network are important to disclose information on local issues but are
unable to reach other localities. Network-connected television stations retransmit
national and regional programs but rarely contribute to the content of their network.8
2.3 Model
Our goal in this section is to develop a simple model to organize the empirical work.
In the model, a federal government allocates disaster relief support, and media spread
the news on disasters and the federal government's responsiveness. Voters then de-
cide whether to vote for the federal government taking into account the information
'Additionally, 890 municipalities are covered by community radio stations, which are low-power
stations with a maximum broadcast range of one kilometer. Community radio stations are normally
operated by local civic groups such as neighborhood associations.
71nformation based on an interview with Marcelo Damasceno, the main journalist at Emissora
Rural and former employee of Radio Grande Rio, a non-connected commercial radio.
8Local content in television is very limited: only 11% of the programming of television channels
is filled with regional information provided by the regional headquarter. [Valente (2009)]. Local
issues are rarely discussed on TV.
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they have about its performance. The results of the model indicate that the federal
government is biased against non-aligned municipalities when it comes to the distri-
bution of drought relief funds. However, the presence of media compensates for such
a bias. In addition, the effect of media increases with the extent of their coverage and
the share of the federal government supporters reached by their news.
2.3.1 Agents and Actions
Consider a country with a number N of municipalities. Each municipality has an equal
number of voters normalized to one who live two periods, t E {1, 2}. Municipalities
are subject to droughts and, in every period, nature chooses one municipality, which
we denote as i, to suffer a drought. The rest of municipalities, which we denote as
j E {1, ..., N} \ {i}, suffer no drought.
In the event of a drought in municipality i in period t, the federal government
allocates ft funds as drought relief for municipality i from a given budget b. Denote
the f as minimum amount of funds the federal government has to allocate to a
municipality i that suffers a drought. The effective aid municipality i receives at is
given by
at = 77fed - ft (2.1)
where fed reflects the ability of the federal government's party to allocate given
resources to those mostly affected by a drought.
The ability of the federal government's party is unknown to both the party
and the voters. Its prior is municipality specific and is uniformly distributed on
L1i - 1L] for s = A, NA. We assume that 4, takes value OA when a mu-
nicipality is controlled by a government that belongs to same party that controls the
federal government -the municipality is aligned to the federal government- and 4NA
otherwise, i.e., 4. E (OA, 4NA}. We assume that 4A > 4NA, which captures that
there is less uncertainty about the ability of the federal government's party in aligned
municipalities than in non-aligned ones.
At the end of period 1 voters decide whether they want to reelect the federal
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government's party for a second term or want to replace it by another party. If they
decide to elect an alternative party, its ability to provide allocated funds in response
to a drought is drawn from a uniform distribution with mean one, E [f"] = 1.
To decide whether they want to remove the federal government's party, voters use
the information they have on the effective aid the affected municipality i receives to
update their prior on the ability of the federal government's party. A share 0 of the
voters from the affected municipality i observes such an aid directly. However, to
learn about it, the other (1 - 0) share of voters from municipality i, as well as the
voters from municipalities j, rely on the information that local radio stations and
radio networks broadcast.
Radio stations learn whether a drought hits one of the municipalities where they
operate, infer the responsiveness of the federal government, at, and disclose such in-
formation in the areas where they operate. Thus, while a local radio station operating
in municipality i is able to divulge at only in municipality i, a network-connected ra-
dio station operating in municipality i can not only disclose at in municipality i but
also spread it to all the other municipalities j where its network operates. Denote A2
as an indicator variable that captures whether there is a radio station in municipality
i,
1 if there is a radio station in municipality i.
O otherwise.
Denote pi, as an indicator variable that captures whether there is a network-
connected radio station in municipality i that also operate is municipality j,
1 if municipalities i and j share a radio network,
pi,j =
0 otherwise.
2.3.2 Preferences
Voters in a given municipality have the following expected utility
U = -pd - (d- a1) - # -pd - (d- a2 ), (2.2)
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where Pd is the probability that a municipality suffers a drought in a given period, d
is the disutility from experiencing a drought, and # is the time discount factor.
The party that controls the federal government has the following expected utility
U= (b-fi)±+ -pr-(b-f 2), (2.3)
where pr is the probability that voters reelect the federal government's party.
2.3.3 Timing
Period 1
1. Nature chooses which municipality i suffers a drought.
2. The federal government allocates funds fi to municipality i.
3. Municipally i receives effective aid a1 .
4. Payoffs are realized.
5. The local radio station in municipality i announces a1 in municipality i.
6. The radio network that has a radio station operating in municipality i announces
a1 in municipality i and the municipalities j where it is also located.
7. Voters vote.
Period 2
1. Nature chooses which municipality i suffers a drought.
2. The federal government allocates funds f2 to municipality i.
3. Municipally i receives effective aid a2.
4. Payoffs are realized.
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2.3.4 Characterization
We characterize the solution of this model through backward induction. In period
2, the party that controls the federal government has no reelection incentives, and
hence, it sets the drought relief funds to the minimum possible, f2 = f. The effective
aid that a municipality stricken by a drought receives in period 2 is then given by
a2 = 7 - f.
At the time of the election voters care only about period 2 utility, which is in-
creasing in 7. Thus, voters decide to vote for the federal government's party if
E [77*Id1] ;> E [hal"] , (2.4)
where E [77fedlI 1 ] is the expected posterior belief that voters have over the ability of
the federal government's party given the information they observe in period 1, 1,
and E [77a4] = 1 is an alternative party's expected ability.
There are two types of voters that we denote as informed and uniformed voters.
Informed voters are the voters that either belong to
1. the share 0 of voters of municipality i that observe the responsiveness of the
federal government, at, directly, or
2. the share (1 - 0) of voters of municipality i that receive information on at from
either a local radio station or a radio station connected to a network, or
3. the municipalities j that receive information on at from a radio network that
operates in both municipality i and their municipality j.
Uninformed voters are the voters that either belong to
1. the share (1 - 9) of voters of municipality i that receive no information on at
from a radio station, or
2. the municipalities j that receive no information on at from a radio network that
operates in both municipality i and their municipality j.
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Since informed voters receive information about a1 , I1 = a1 , they are able to
update the prior on qfed and form the following expected posterior belief over the
ability of the federal government's party,
E [,fedla1] = a, (2.5)
fi
where fi is the expected equilibrium fi.
Using (2.5) and (2.1), we can re-express (2.4) as 77 > . Thus, the expected vote
share for the federal government's party for informed voters is
7r. = - + - (2.6)2
Uninformed voters are unable to update the prior belief over 7fed, 1 = 0, and
hence, E [fed I1] = 1. Thus, since these voters are indifferent between the party that
controls the federal government and alternative party, they randomly decide which
one they vote for, and hence,
r., (2.7)
2
Using (2.6) and (2.7), the reelection probability that the party that controls the
federal government has is given by the following expression:
21 f2 N 2b±A(1 -R O±~~ A qR5 NA) (1~) (2.8)
where R = Zji i_ p and RfA = j=NA j represent the number of
aligned and non-aligned municipalities j where the radio network that operates in
municipality i also operates, respectively.
The federal government party then solves the following problem
max{(b- fi) + -pr. - (b -f}. (2.9)fi<b
Thus, from the first order condition and the constraint fi < b, it follows that fi takes
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the following expression 9
f1 =min3- (9-$+ -A. (1-0) -i +R .$A+RfA -NA) -(b - f) /N, b}.
(2.10)
From the expression of fi in (2.10), it follows that, given (p, 0, #A, #NA, R-, Rf7A, b,
f, N), there are three possible cases, A, B and C, which are reflected in Figure 2-4.
Case A: 0-0-4NA (b-L)/N b
In case A, the parameter restriction is such that the federal government allocates all
the budget to any municipality that suffers a drought in period 1, there is no bias of
the federal government's party against non-aligned municipalities, and radio stations
play no role. These results are reflected in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If 9 - 0 - $NA - (b - f) /N > b,
1. f1 = b for any municipality affected by a drought in period 1,
2. f1 (#OA, .) = f1 (NA, -) (no bias), and
3. For f (#NA, i , R , RNA), it follows that f1 ($NA, 0, 0, 0) = f i NA, i , RRf A)
VA i, R, R^ > 0 (no role for radio stations).
All proofs are straightforward and omitted. The budget constraint is always bind-
ing and the federal government allocates all the budget to any municipality that
suffers a drought in period 1. The votes that the federal government's party would
lose due to lack of responsiveness from any municipality affected by a drought are
sufficient to discipline it. Thereby, whether the affected municipality is aligned to
the federal government's party has no effect on the drought relief funds it receives.
Whether there is a radio station in the affected municipality also has no effect.
9The second order condition holds since the vote share for the federal government party is concave
in fi.
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Case B: 3-0 -# A -(b - f) /N ;>b> -- $NA (b - f) /N
The parameter restriction in case B implies that, relative to case A, the situation is
unchanged for aligned municipalities. However, there is potentially a bias in provision
of drought relief by the federal government's party against non-aligned municipalities.
Thus, there is scope for radio stations to compensate such a bias. These results are
reflected in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If-.#A - (b-f) /N > b> -0-$NA- (b-f)/|N,
1. Consider the case (Ai, R , RNA) = (0, 0, 0),
A 0 fb if aligned municipality i,
S- 0 - $N A' (b - f) /N < b if non-aligned municipality i and,
2. fi (4A,-) fi (#NA, -) (bias),
3. For fi (#NA, Ai, R7 RNA) < b, it follows that fi (qNA , 1, 1, 0) > f1 (qNA, 1, 0, 1)
> f1 (ONA, 1 , 0, 0) > f1 (NA , 0, 0,0 ) (role for radio stations, a network-connected
radio station has a bigger effect than a local radio station, and its effect is
increasing in the share of its audience that supports the federal government's
party).
In the absence of a radio station operating in a non-aligned municipality affected
by a drought, the electoral loss the federal government's party suffers when it is not
responsive enough is no longer sufficient to discipline it. The difference in the federal
government's aid towards aligned and non-aligned municipalities comes from the fact
that aligned municipalities are more responsive to the government's performance in
the management of a drought.
As indicated in Figure 2-4, the radio stations operating in non-aligned municipali-
ties contribute to compensate for the bias of the federal government's party. Further,
network-connected radio stations are better able at compensating for this bias than
local stations since they can hold the federal government accountable not only to the
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voters that are not directly informed in municipality i, but also to all the other voters
in the municipalities j where it also operates. In addition, the effect of a network-
connected radio station should be increasing in both R#. and RNA but relatively more
in R. In words, the larger the proportion of their audience that is comprised of sup-
porters of the federal government, the bigger the electoral cost they can potentially
inflict to a non-responsive federal government.
Case C: b > / -0-O -4 (b -1) N
Given the parameter restriction in case C, relative to case B, the situation is un-
changed for non-aligned municipalities. However, the federal government no longer
allocates all the budget to an aligned municipality if it suffers a drought in period
1. Thus, there is scope for radio stations to incentivize the federal government's pro-
vision of drought relief towards aligned municipalities. In addition, the bias of the
federal government's party against non-aligned municipalities persists. These results
are reflected in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 b > # - 0 - 4A - (b - f) /N,
1. Consider the case (Ai, R 4 , RNA) = (0, 0,0),
0 - 0 - 4A - (b - f) /N < b if aligned municipality i,
3 - 0 - 4NA - (b - f) N < b if non-aligned municipality i and,
2. fi (4A,-) fi (4NA, -) (bias),
3. For fi (4,, Ai, Ri', RCA) < b, for s E {A, NA}, it follows that fi (4,,1,1,0) >
fi (48, 1, 0, 1) > fi (4,, 1, 0, 0) > fi (4, 0, 0, 0) (role for radio stations, a network-
connected radio station has a bigger effect than a local radio station, and its effect
is increasing in the share of its audience that supports the federal government's
party).
In the absence of a radio station operating in a aligned municipality affected
by a drought, the electoral loss the federal government's party suffers when it is
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not responsive enough is no longer sufficient to discipline it. The bias of the federal
government's party against non-aligned municipalities and the role that different radio
stations plays work as in case B.
2.3.5 Data
We use several data sources to conduct our empirical analysis. Our main outcome
variable comes from the National Secretariat of Civil Defense, and it is an indicator
variable for whether a municipality had a state of emergency declared due to drought
in a given year. During our period of analysis -2002 to 2008- the federal government
declared a state of emergency due to droughts in over 3,200 municipalities, which
represent an average of 8% of municipalities per year.
We identify municipalities that have experienced droughts by using information
on the monthly level of rainfall at the meteorological station level between 1961 and
2010. INMET, the Brazilian Institute of Meteorology, provides this information for
280 stations, which are illustrated in Figure 2-1. As in the example in Figure 2-2, we
interpolate this information for the whole of Brazil and then calculate the municipal
levels of rainfall. Our main measure of drought is the municipal rainfall z-score for
the Spring-Summer season, i.e., the deviation from the historical mean normalized by
the historical standard deviation." Since we focus on low precipitation events, we set
positive z-scores to zero. As indicated in Table 2.1, the mean level for rainfall z-score
in the period we study is -0.29 and the standard deviation is 0.41.
The election data is from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Superior Electoral
Court). A municipality is aligned to the federal government if it is governed by a
mayor from the same party. This variable may change every two years since Munici-
pal and Presidential elections take place every four years and are two years apart."
From 2002 to 2008, 92% of municipalities were non-aligned to the federal government.
10We take into account only rainfall levels during Spring and Summer because this is the main
crop season for the majority of crops cultivated in Brazil.
"While presidential elections occurred in 2002, 2006 and 2010, municipal elections took place in
2000, 2004 and 2008. Because the Labor Party (PT) governed Brazil from 2003 to 2010, in practice
our variation comes mainly from power switches at the federal level in 2003 and at the municipal
level in 2005 and 2009.
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We identify media presence in each municipality by using information from ANA-
TEL, the Brazilian regulator of communications, on all media outlets in Brazil, their
location, the date they were licensed issued, and the list of partners that are mem-
bers of the board of each media outlet.13 We rely on the Donos da Midia database to
identify which radio and television stations are connected to a network. According
to our database, 32 percent of municipalities have a commercial radio station, and
6 percent have a radio station connected to a network. Figure 2-3 illustrates all the
Brazilian municipalities where a radio network operates in 2008. Television stations
are more widespread, reaching 55 percent of municipalities. 99% of these television
stations are connected to a network and they simply retransmit content.
Based on the Donos da Midia information on media networks, we calculated the
coverage of each network by considering the number of municipalities in which each
operates, and the total population in these municipalities. Additionally, we divided
the measure of media network coverage into coverage of aligned municipalities and
coverage of non-aligned municipalities by taking into account the political alignment
of the municipalities reached by each media network. Table 2.1 indicates that a radio
network covers on average 3.8 municipalities and potentially reaches 940,000 people.14
We track the political connection of each partner that is on the board of a media
'
2 We also calculate alternative definitions of political coalition which take into account whether the
mayor is from the same party that controls the Minister of National Integration, which is responsible
for Disaster Relief Policy. Results do not differ when we also consider as aligned municipalities those
that are from the state from which the Minister of National Integration originates and are aligned to
the party that controls the Ministry. The specification where we also include as aligned municipalities
all municipalities under the party that controls the Ministry provides noisy estimates. The reason is
the nature of the party that controlled the Ministry over most of the our time-period, the Partido do
Movimento Democrtico Brasileiro (PMDB). While the PMDB governs a fifth of the municipalities
in Brazil, it is a very fragmented party controlled by several independent regional bosses.
13 We identified all media outlets in Brazil by considering all the outlets that appear in the Sistema
de Controle de Radiofusao (SCR) at ANATEL website. This website also provides the location of
each outlet and a list of all documents that have been issued to each media outlet. As a proxy for
their licensing date, we use the date that the first document in the name of the outlet was issued.
Information on partners come from ANATEL's Sistema de Acompanhamento de Controle Societario
(SIACCO). We use a list of partners of media outlets from April 2012.
"We consider the state capitals in the computation of network coverage but we remove these
municipalities from our sample in the empirical exercises. We want to avoid state capitals driving
the results because all these municipalities have a network-connected radio station and are politically
important.
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outlet by matching his or her name to the names of politicians. We use two different
matching procedures depending on the politicians' rank. For local politicians, we
identified the names of mayors and local councilors elected in 2000, 2004 and 2008,
and consider a politician to own a media outlet if her name is on the board of a media
outlet in the same municipality she was elected. Also, we consider that a politician is
connected to a media outlet if she owns it or shares a family name with someone on the
board of a media outlet located in the same municipality.1 5 Our calculations indicate
that, while 8% of Brazilian municipalities have a commercial radio station connected
to a mayor or local councilor, 1% of municipalities have a network-connected radio
associated with a local politician.
For state and federal congressmen, we use the list of elected politicians in 1998,
2002 and 2006, and consider they own a media outlet if their name appears on the
board of any media outlet in 2012, regardless of the location of the media outlet and
their political base. This assignment of media to congressmen follows the pattern we
found in the data which indicates that many politicians own media in municipalities
that are not their political strongholds or even in states that they do not represent.
We identified that in 2% of the municipalities there is a commercial radio station
directly owned by a congressmen. We acknowledge that our method may underesti-
mate the number of media outlets controlled by politicians since research has shown
that politicians indirectly control media by assigning relatives or friends to the board
of media outlets (see Lima (2006) and Gorgen (2002)).
Finally, we gather information from the 2000 population census, conducted by
the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE), on municipal characteristics such as pop-
ulation, urbanization rate, population density, income per capita, poverty rate and
average years of schooling. We use these covariates in our empirical exercise to con-
trol for municipal characteristics that may correlate with media presence, economic
15We were very conservative in this matching and did not consider that two individuals are relatives
if they share very common family names such as Silva, Costa and Santos. In particular, we did not
match names whose frequency is greater than 5 percent in the state.
16Unfortunately we do not have the municipality of origin for each congressman, and thus we are
unable to perform the same matching procedure we use with local politicians to see whether they
are indirectly connected to a media outlet.
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development, and political alignment. The FINBRA database, from the Brazilian
Treasury, provides information on municipal revenue, which we use to control for the
financial capacity of a municipality to deal with natural disasters.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In this section we develop the empirical strategy used to test the predictions of the
model. Our empirical approach first identifies whether case A, B or C best represents
the setup we study. Second, it tests the predictions of our model regarding the role
of media.
Our analysis is at the municipal level. To identify whether case A, B or C best
represents the setup we study, we conduct two types of specifications. Our first
specification is as follows
ddmt = o± + 01 - zt + 02 - namt +8 -zmt - namt + 'Xmt + 77m + 4t + emt (2.11)
where ddmt is a dummy variable that indicates whether a municipality m received a
drought declaration in year t, zmt is the normalized level of precipitation during the
Spring-Summer season censored at zero, and namt is a dummy variable that indicates
that a municipality is not aligned to the federal government.' 7 The specification
includes municipality fixed effects q7m and year fixed effects #t. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
Xmt are a series of controls interacted with zmt that deal with potential concerns
that our estimates of interest capture the effect of omitted variables related to mu-
nicipal economic development and state capacity. The controls include income per
capita, poverty rate, municipal Gini coefficient, average years of schooling, infant
mortality, share of households with electricity, municipal GDP per capita, munici-
"We normalize the level of precipitation during the Spring-Summer season by subtracting its
historical mean and dividing by its historical standard deviation. Results using an indicator variable
for whether there is a drought are qualitatively similar.
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pal revenue per capita, tax revenue per capita, population, area, population density,
urbanization, distance to state capital, and a dummy for being a coastal municipality.
A more robust specification includes a series of flexible controls for the municipal
vote share of the federal government's party and their interaction with an indicator for
a municipality not being aligned with the federal government's party, f (vfmt, namt). 18
This specification delivers regression discontinuity estimates, and thus addresses the
fact that potential differences between aligned and non-aligned municipalities might
confound our estimates.19
#3 allows us to address whether case A, B or C best represents the setup we study.
If #3 < 0, our model suggests we should be under case B or C since it implies that
non-aligned municipalities are less likely to receive drought relief. If 33 = 0, our
model suggests that we should be in case A since it indicates that municipalities are
equally likely to receive drought relief regardless of whether or not they are aligned
to the federal government.2 o
Our second specification is as follows
ddmt = PO + P1 - zm + 2 - namt + )3 - zmt -namt + /4 - mediaj4.12)
jE{lr,rn,tv}
+ P j - media jnt - zmt + p /6j - mediajmt - namt
jE{ir,rn,tv} jE{lr,rn,tv}
+ Z pj- mediaj zm -nat + 'Xmt + ,m + + Emt
jE{lr,rn,tv}
where media lrmt captures the presence of a local commercial radio station, mediarnmt
captures the presence of a commercial radio station connected to a network, and
media-tvmt captures the presence of a television station. For robustness, we also
provide regression discontinuity estimates as in the specification in equation (2.12).21
18f (vfmt, namt) = 71 Vfmt ±72 'namt ' vfmt i~73 'vf mt +74 -namt ' vfmt + 75'vf mt +76 * namt * vf 3mt.
Alternative specifications yield quantitatively similar results.
19Unfortunately, we do not have enough variation to conduct a local linear regression specifica-
tion. To that end, we would need significant variation in the levels of precipitation experienced by
municipalities with highly contested elections.
2 0 lf '33 > 0, our model would not be able to describe the data.
2 1The inability to provide local linear regression estimates is exacerbated in this specification. To
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Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
If the results of our first specification suggest that either case B or C best represent
the setup we study, the model predicts that #7j > 0 for j E {lr, rn}, as well as $7,n >
#71,. That is, while both local and network-connected radio stations compensate the
bias that non-aligned municipalities suffer when it comes to receiving drought relief,
radio stations connected to a network are better able to compensate for such a bias.
Further, while in case B the model predicts that 35j = 0 for j E {lr, rn}, in case C
it predicts that #5i > 0 for j E {lr, rn}. In words, media should contribute to the
likelihood that aligned municipalities receive drought aid in case C but not in case B.
Additionally, the model predicts that, regardless of whether we are in case B or C,
#65 = #7j = 0 for j E {tv} since television stations rarely broadcast local content and
do not disseminate local information through their network.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results
Table 2.2 reports the results of our empirical specification in equation (2.11). Col-
umn (1) presents the baseline specification, and column (2) adds a series of flexible
controls for the municipal vote share of the federal government's party and their in-
teraction with a municipal non-alignment indicator. Consistent with cases B and C of
the model, results in column (1) suggest that non-aligned municipalities are 5% less
likely to receive drought relief from the federal government. Regression discontinuity
estimates in column (2) indicate that this result is not driven by potential differences
in aligned and non-aligned municipalities.
Overall the results from Table 2.2 are consistent with cases B and C of the model.
Table 2.3 reports the results of the empirical specification in equation (2.12) to dis-
entangle which of these two cases best represents the data. Column (1) presents
the most basic specification where we interact the regressors in specification (2.11)
that end, we would not only need sufficient variation in the levels of precipitation but also enough
variation in the presence of media outlets in municipalities with highly contested elections.
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with an indicator of municipal presence of a radio station connected to a network.
Column (2) adds the interactions with an indicator of municipal presence of a local
radio station. Column (3) adds instead the interactions with an indicator of munic-
ipal presence of a television station. Column (4) adds the interactions with both an
indicator of municipal presence of a local radio station and an indicator of municipal
presence of a television station. Columns (5) to (8) provide regression discontinuity
estimates for the specifications in columns (1) to (4).
Consistent with case B, results in column (1) suggest that, while radio stations
connected to a network contribute to the likelihood that non-aligned municipalities
receive drought relief from the federal government, such an effect is absent for the
case of aligned municipalities. The magnitude of the effect of network-connected radio
stations is such that it compensates the federal government's bias against non-aligned
municipalities.
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 2.3 show that local radio stations and television
stations do not have the same effect of radio stations connected to a network. Thus,
as predicted by the model, the effect that network-connected radio stations have on
the likelihood that non-aligned municipalities receive drought relief from the federal
government is significantly larger than the one of local radio stations. The estimates
on the effect of local radio stations and television stations are consistent with the fact
that they do not affect the content of the media in other municipalities. Regression
discontinuity estimates in columns (5) to (8) indicate that the mentioned results are
not driven by potential differences in aligned and non-aligned municipalities.
2.5.2 Channel
Overall, results from Table 2.2 and 2.3 are consistent with case B of the model. They
indicate that radio stations connected to a network contribute significantly to com-
pensate for the bias in the distribution of drought relief that the federal government
has against non-aligned municipalities. To further test the implications of the model,
we test the mechanism. In the model, the coverage of the network of a network-
connected radio station that operates in a non-aligned municipality affected by a
87
drought is essential for the likelihood that the municipality receives drought relief
from the federal government.
To test for the empirical relevance of such a mechanism, we consider the following
specification
ddmt = 0±+ 1 - Zmt + 2 * namt + - zmt - namt + 4 - cov _rnmt (2.13)
+05 covrnmt - zmt + 06 - covrn - namt
+37 cov-rnmt - zmt - namt + J'Xmt + 77m + 4t + emt,
where cov.rnmt represents the coverage of a radio network that operates in munici-
pality m. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Panel A in Table 2.4 reports the results of the empirical specification in equation
(2.13) where the measure of coverage is the number of municipalities that belong to the
radio network. We consider as a regressor the coverage of a radio network in aligned
and non-aligned municipalities in column (1), only in aligned municipalities in column
(2), and only in non-aligned municipalities in column (3). The distinction between
coverage on aligned and non-aligned municipalities allows us to test the prediction
that the effect of network-connected radio stations should be larger when the coverage
of their networks outside municipality i is in aligned municipalities rather than in non-
aligned municipalities. Columns (4) to (6) provide regression discontinuity estimates
for the specifications in columns (1) to (3).
Results in column (1) support the model's prediction that the coverage of the
radio network is central for the probability that non-aligned municipalities receive
drought relief from the federal government after experiencing low precipitation. 22
Additionally, while we lack statistical power to distinguish between the effect of the
coverage in aligned and non-aligned municipalities, as predicted by the model, results
in column (2) and (3) indicate that the effect of the coverage in aligned municipalities
2 2 Regressions, where we also include media..rnmt - zmt, media-rnmi -namt, and media-rnmt - zmt -
namt, yield the same result although with lower statistical power. There are only 6% of municipalities
with radio networks and we lack enough variation across them. Additionally, using the continuous
measure of non-alignment also yields a qualitatively similar result.
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is stronger. Regression discontinuity estimates in columns (4) to (6) indicate that the
mentioned results are not driven by potential differences in aligned and non-aligned
municipalities.
Panel B in Table 2.4 replicates the estimates in Panel A using an alternative
measure of coverage: the population covered by the radio network. Results in Panel
B are in line with those in Panel A.
2.5.3 Alternative Explanations
While results suggest that network-connected radio stations play a significant role
in compensating for the federal government's bias against non-aligned municipalities
in the distribution of drought relief aid, there is the concern that the presence of
a radio station connected to a network might capture the effect of other omitted
municipal attributes. Potential candidates are variables related to the municipal
economic development, state capacity and political influence.
Economic Development and State Capacity
If less developed municipalities or municipalities that have weaker state capacity are
also more likely to have a regional network operating, the presence of a regional
network could be simply picking up on the fact that the federal government is more
likely to distribute drought relief aid to these types of municipalities. To address
the empirical relevance of the concern of omitted variables related to the municipal
economic development and state capacity, we conduct the following empirical test
outcomem = #0 +1 - nam + 1 #j - media-jm + (2.14)
jE{all,rn,}
3 3j - media-jm - nam + Em,
jE{all,rn}
where outcomem is a variable that measures either the municipal economic develop-
ment or the financial capacity of municipality m, media..allmt captures the presence of
a commercial radio station in municipality m, and media.rnmt is an indicator variable
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for a commercial radio station connected to a network in municipality m. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
Table 2.5 reports the results of our empirical specification in equation (2.14) for
the cross section of Brazilian municipalities in 2002, the first year of our sample. In
Panel A, the outcome variables are the municipal: population, urbanization rate,
area, distance to state capital, indicator for coastal, income per capita, and Gini
coefficient. In Panel B the outcome variables are the municipal: poverty rate, aver-
age years of schooling, mortality rate, share of households with electricity, GDP per
capita, revenue per capita, and tax revenue per capita. Table 2.6 provides regression
discontinuity estimates for the specifications in Table 2.5.
Consider the universe of non-aligned municipalities where there are radio stations.
Results in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 indicate that, out of the 14 municipal outcomes we
consider, none of them is statistically different when the radio station is connected to
a network. Thus, while we lack randomness in the location of radio stations connected
to a network, these results suggest that it is unlikely that the presence of a network-
connected radio station might capture the effect of other omitted municipal attributes
related to economic development and state capacity.
Political Influence
The concern that the effect of a network-connected radio station that we estimate
might not capture the influence of media but rather the political influence of the
municipality remains. In particular, a radio station connected to a network may
be located in a municipality that constitutes the political stronghold of a powerful
politician. This is a concern given the evidence that media outlets are controlled by
political bosses and used as means to consolidate political power. 23 To address this
23For instance, Boas and Hidalgo (2011) find that media control facilitates the entrenchment of
local politicians in Brazil. Politicians have a higher chance to obtain a license of a community radio
station, and the ownership of a radio station substantially increases the probability of winning local
elections. Stadnik (1991) points out that 79 out of 503 Congressmen owned, directly or indirectly,
a TV or radio station in 1991. In addition, Motter (1994) documents that half of the concessions
for television and radio stations issued in six decades were distributed by former president Sarney
between 1985 and 1998 and disproportionally favored politicians who voted on key legislation, such
as amendments to the 1988 constitution.
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worry, we conduct the following specification
ddmt = PO + B1 -Zmt +fl2 -namt + 3 - media-rnmt + 134 - zmt -namt (2.15)
+±35 mediarnm- zmi + 6 - mediar..mt - namt
+17 media-rnt .zn - na ±t +,88 - media-polmt
+P9 media-polmt zmt + P10 - media-polmt - nant
+011 - media-polmt - zmt - namt + r,'Xmt + 'qm + 4 t + emt
where mediaxrnmt captures the municipal presence of a radio station connected to
a network, and media-polmt is an indicator variable that a politician (mayor, local
councilor, and state and federal congressman) owns a network-connected radio station
in municipality i or it is associated to it through a family member. 24 Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
Table 2.7 reports the results of our empirical specification in equation (2.15).
Column (1) considers the simplest specification where we only look at the effect of
local politician's ownership of and association with a network-connected radio station
without controlling for the regressors that capture the effect of the presence of a radio
station connected to a network. Column (2) adds theses regressors. Columns (3) and
(4) provide regression discontinuity estimates for the specifications in columns (1)
and (2).
Results in column (2) show that the finding that radio stations connected to a
network are able to compensate for the federal governments' bias against non-aligned
municipalities is robust to the inclusion of regressors that capture the the municipal
potential political influence on media. Additionally, these results suggest that local
politicians' ownership of and association with network-connected radio stations does
not help non-aligned municipalities to compensate for the federal government's bias
in the distribution of drought relief support. Regression discontinuity estimates in
"Results do not differ when we instead consider separate specifications for local politicians (mayors
and local councilors) and congressmen.
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columns (3) and (4) are consistent with these results.
Placebo Exercise
Finally, as a placebo exercise, instead of considering the definition of a radio network
as in the Donos da Midia database, we construct an alternative definition exploiting
the ownership structure across different media outlets. We consider that a radio
station is part of a network if one of its board members is also part of the board
of another radio station located in a different municipality. We then conduct the
following specification
ddmt = & + 01 - zmt +32 -namt + 3 - mediarnmt +64 - zrt - namt (2.16)
+65 media-rnmt zmt + 6 - media-rnmt - namt
+±37 media-rnmt -zm - namt + 18 - share-ownmt
+±39 share-ownmt - zm + 1o - share-ownmt - namt
+0, - share-ownmt - zmt - namt + I'Xmt + 77m + 4t + emt
where share..ownmt is an indicator variable that a radio station belongs to a radio
network according to the alternative definition.
Table 2.8 reports the results of our empirical specification in equation (2.16).
Column (1) considers the simplest specification where we only look at the effect of
the presence of a radio that is connected to other radio stations through common
ownership without controlling for the presence of a radio station connected to a
network. Column (2) adds regressors that control for such a presence. Columns (3)
and (4) provide regression discontinuity estimates for the specifications in columns
(1) and (2).
Results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that connectivity to radio stations in other
municipalities through common ownership does not contribute to the likelihood that
non-aligned municipalities receive federal drought relief support. Columns (3) and
(4) show that these results also hold when we consider a regression discontinuity
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specification.
These results support the prediction of the model that network-connected radio
stations are important because they disclose information on disasters to non-affected
places. Radio stations connected through ownership do not play this role because they
do not have systematic mechanisms to collect and share information on a frequent
basis, as do radio networks who have central stations.
In addition, it is possible that the alternative definition of radio network we con-
sider in our placebo analysis might also capture the capacity that media owners have
to exert political influence. The reason is that the media owners that control several
media outlets are better positioned to exert political influence. If such was the case
and media owners exerted political influence, our placebo analysis estimates would
indicate that media owners do use their political influence to compensate for political
biases.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence of the role of media in compensating for central
governments' bias against non-aligned constituencies in the distribution of resources.
We analyze how media presence, connectivity and ownership affect the distribution
of federal drought relief transfers to Brazilian municipalities.
Our identification strategy exploits exogenous variation in precipitation and the
identity of the winning party in close municipal elections, as well as variation in the
presence of local and network-connected radio stations.
We show that, while municipalities that are not aligned to the federal government
are significantly less likely to receive drought relief aid when experiencing low precipi-
tation, the presence of a radio station connected to a network compensates for such a
bias. The effect of network-connected radio stations is absent for local radio stations
and television stations. The main difference of radio stations connected to a network
relative to local radio stations and television stations is that network-connected radio
stations affect the content of the media in other municipalities. Hence, these findings
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suggest the importance of radio networks for the dissemination of local information
that is politically relevant.
We provide additional evidence that suggests that the effect of network-connected
radio stations increases with their network coverage outside the affected municipal-
ities. This evidence reinforces the idea that the mechanism behind our results is
media's ability to spread the news to other constituencies. Also, we show evidence
that rules out that our findings are explained by the omitted variables that capture
the municipal economic development and state capacity or by the manipulation of
media outlets by politicians.
Our findings bring to light the federal government's strategic allocation of re-
sources for electoral purposes and point out that radio networks play a central role for
political accountability, and consequently have important policy implications. First,
our results suggest the need of regulation and independent auditing of the process
of allocation of federal resources to avoid distortions. Second, our results stress the
need of bearing in mind the importance of the media network's role in the diffusion
of politically relevant information when developing market mechanisms that enhance
political accountability.
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Appendix A: Figures and Tables
Figure 2-1: Rainfall stations
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Figure 2-2: Example of rainfall interpolation
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No Radio Network
Figure 2-3: Municipalities where a radio network operates
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Figure 2-4: Cases of the model
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable
State of emergency declared
Drought (- z-score of rainfall censored at zero)
Municipality not aligned to federal government
Radio station
Network-connected radio station
Television
Network-connected television station
Radio station associated to local politician
Network-connected radio station associated to local politician
Radio station associated to congressman
Network-connected radio station associated to congressman
Radio station associated to politician
Network-connected radio station associated to politician
Number of municipalities covered by radio network
Total population covered by radio network (1,000 hab.)
Observations
38752
38752
38737
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
38752
Note: Local politicians includes mayors and local councilors. Congressmen include federal and
state congressmen. Any politician includes both local politicians and congressmen.
Table 2.2: Federal government's bias against non-aligned municipalities
(1) (2)
Drought 0.211 0.244
(0.372) (0.380) )
Non-alignment 0.003 0.007
(0.016) (0.035)
Drought x Non-alignment -0.050 -0.062
(0.021)** (0.025)**
RD Controls No Yes
Observations 36,580 36,580
R-squared 0.405 0.408
Note: The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a mu-
nicipal state of emergency. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Mean
0.08
0.29
0.92
0.32
0.06
0.57
0.55
0.08
0.01
0.02
0
0.09
0.01
3.81
940
S.D.
0.28
0.41
0.27
0.47
0.23
0.5
0.5
0.27
0.1
0.15
0.04
0.28
0.090
17.73
5000
Table 2.3: Estimates on the effect of network-connected radio
municipalities
Drought
Non-alignment
Network-Connected Radio Station
Drought x Non-align.
Non-align. x Network-Conn. Radio Station
Drought x Network-Conn. Radio Station
Drought x Non-align. x Net.-Conn. Radio Stat.
Drought x Non-align. x Local Radio
(1)
0.280
(0.422)
0.009
(0.017)
0.041
(0.063)
-0.062
(0.024)**
-0.067
(0.040)
-0.07
(0.062)
0.168
(0.075)**
Drought x Non-align. x Television
(2)
0.349
(0.475)
0.003
(0.016)
0.048
(0.074)
-0.071
(0.025)***
-0.078
(0.046)
-0.053
(0.071)
0.146
(0.080)*
0.025
(0.022)
stations on the federal government's bias against non-aligned
(3)
0.294
(0.473)
0.001
(0.012)
0.044
(0.067)
-0.065
(0.030)**
-0.072
(0.043)
-0.068
(0.071)
0.166
(0.077)**
0.005
(0.034)
(4)
0.354
(0.515)
-0.001
(0.012)
0.048
(0.076)
-0.069
(0.030)**
-0.079
(0.048)
-0.054
(0.076)
0.147
(0.082)*
0.027
(0.019)
-0.005
(0.035)
(5)
0.310
(0.430)
0.011
(0.034)
0.028
(0.060)
-0.072
(0.028)**
-0.068
(0.040)
-0.055
(0.066)
0.149
(0.068)**
(6)
0.377
(0.479)
0.006
(0.034)
0.035
(0.072)
-0.077
(0.028)**
-0.079
(0.047)
-0.042
(0.074)
0.133
(0.078)
0.014
(0.025)
RD Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 36580 36580 36580 36580 36580 36580
R-squared 0.405 0.406 0.405 0.406 0.409 0.409
Note: The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a municipal state of emergency.
municipality fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) include the foll
local radio station, drought x local radio station, and non-alignment x local radio station. Columns (3), (4), (7) and
omitted regressors: television station, drought x television station, and non-alignment x television station. * p<.1, ** p
(7) (8)
0.304 0.365
(0.474) (0.516)
0.005 0.002
(0.030) (0.031)
0.031 0.036
(0.064) (0.074)
-0.075 -0.077
(0.034)** (0.034)**
-0.072 -0.080
(0.043) (0.048)
-0.057 -0.044
(0.075) (0.079)
0.148 0.134
(0.072)* (0.081)
0.014
(0.022)
0.006 -0.000
(0.036) (0.036)
Yes Yes
36580 36580
0.409 0.409
All specifications include
owing omitted regressors:
(8) include the following
<.05, *** P<.01.
Table 2.4: Estimates on the heterogeneous effects of network-connected radio stations
by the size of their network coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Coverage is the logarithmic number of municipalities a radio network covers
Drought 0.298 0.302 0.299 0.329 0.334 0.329
Non-alignment
Coverage
Drought x Non-alignment
Drought x Coverage
Non-alignment x Coverage
Drought x Non-align. x Cov.
RD Controls
Observations
R-squared
(0.430)
0.009
(0.018)
0.008
(0.019)
-0.063
(0.025)**
-0.013
(0.017)
-0.018
(0.010)*
0.044
(0.019)**
No
36,580
0.406
(0.430)
0.009
(0.017)
0.108
(0.046)**
-0.062
(0.025)**
-0.023
(0.032)
-0.026
(0.017)
0.083
(0.036)**
No
36,580
0.406
(0.430)
0.009
(0.018)
-0.159
(0.105)
-0.063
(0.025)**
-0.014
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.010)
0.045
(0.019)**
No
36,580
0.406
(0.439)
0.011
(0.034)
0.003
(0.018)
-0.073
(0.028)**
-0.010
(0.018)
-0.018
(0.010)*
0.039
(0.017)**
Yes
36,580
0.409
(0.438)
0.013
(0.034)
0.106
(0.043)**
-0.072
(0.028)**
-0.016
(0.034)
-0.027
(0.018)
0.070
(0.032)**
Yes
36,580
0.410
(0.438)
0.012
(0.034)
-0.157
(0.095)
-0.073
(0.028)**
-0.010
(0.019)
-0.017
(0.010)
0.040
(0.018)**
Yes
36,580
0.409
Panel B: Coverage is the logarithmic population covered
Drought 0.274 0.279
(0.419) (0.422)
Non-alignment 0.009 0.009
(0.018) (0.018)
Coverage 0.003 0.010
(0.004) (0.005)*
Drought x Non-alignment -0.062 -0.062
(0.025)** (0.025)** (
Drought x Coverage -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Non-alignment x Coverage -0.004 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
Drought x Non-align. x Cov. 0.010 0.012
(0.005)** (0.005)** (
RD Controls No No
Observations 36,580 36,580
R-squared 0.405 0.406
by radio
0.272
(0.418)
0.009
(0.018)
-0.040
(0.042)
-0.062
0.025)**
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.002)
0.010
0.005)**
No
36,580
0.406
network (per
0.304
(0.428)
0.010
(0.035)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.072
(0.028)**
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.002)
0.009
(0.004)**
Yes
36,580
0.409
1,000 habitants)
0.311 0.302
(0.431) (0.426)
0.011 0.011
(0.034) (0.035)
0.010 -0.038
(0.005)* (0.040)
-0.072 -0.072
(0.028)** (0.028)**
-0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
-0.005 -0.004
(0.003) (0.002)
0.010 0.009
(0.005)** (0.004)**
Yes Yes
36,580 36,580
0.409 0.409
Note: The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a mu-
nicipal state of emergency. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. The measure of coverage is the number of municipalities that
belong to the radio network in Panel A and the population covered by the radio network in Panel
B. "Coverage" is the coverage of a radio network in aligned and non-aligned municipalities in
columns (1) and (4), only in aligned municipalities in column (2) and (5), and only in non-aligned
municipalities in columns (3) and (6). * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 2.5: Estimates on differences in covariates of non-aligned municipalities that have a radio network operating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Outcome: Population Urbanization Area Distance to Coastal Income Gini Index
Rate State Capital per Capita
Non-alignment -0.040 -0.037 -0.089 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.036) (0.009)*** (0.052)* (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002)
Radio Station 1.297 0.171 0.668 -0.011 0.038 0.055 0.014
(0.064)*** (0.016)*** (0.093)*** (0.012) (0.016)** (0.006)*** (0.004)***
Radio Network 2.065 0.282 0.590 -0.010 0.020 0.149 0.006
(0.122)*** (0.030)*** (0.177)*** (0.023) (0.030) (0.012)*** (0.008)
Non-alignment x Radio Station 0.030 0.037 -0.031 -0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.002
(0.071) (0.017)** (0.103) (0.014) (0.018) (0.007) (0.005)
Non-align. x Radio Net. -0.168 -0.001 0.084 0.026 0.011 -0.007 0.003
(0.134) (0.033) (0.194) (0.025) (0.033) (0.013) (0.009)
Observations 5,531 5,478 5,478 5,478 5,478 5,478 5,478
R-squared 0.377 0.189 0.054 0.002 0.006 0.177 0.008
Panel B
Outcome: Poverty Years of Mortality Electricity GDP Revenue Tax Revenue
Rate Schooling Rate per Capita per Capita per Capita
Non-alignment 0.768 -0.007 0.003 -0.465 0.000 -0.057 -0.007
(0.914) (0.047) (0.001)** (0.690) (0.000) (0.044) (0.003)***
Radio Station -10.063 0.898 -0.009 6.574 0.002 -0.225 0.016
(1.623)*** (0.084)*** (0.002)*** (1.226)*** (0.000)*** (0.078)*** (0.004)***
Radio Network -26.014 2.093 -0.023 11.891 0.004 -0.165 0.055
(3.089)*** (0.160)*** (0.004)*** (2.332)*** (0.001)*** (0.150) (0.009)***
Non-alignment x Radio -2.256 0.106 -0.002 1.063 -0.000 0.056 0.011
(1.798) (0.093) (0.002) (1.357) (0.000) (0.086) (0.005)**
Non-align. x Radio Net. 0.629 -0.062 -0.002 0.617 -0.000 0.030 -0.006
(3.388) (0.175) (0.005) (2.558) (0.001) (0.164) (0.009)
Observations 5,478 5,478 5,478 5,478 5,531 5,196 5,196
R-squared 0.101 0.216 0.052 0.056 0.030 0.006 0.060
Note: The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a municipal state of emergency. All specifications include
municipality fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. "Population" is the logarithmic of the total municipal population.
"Area" is the logarithmic of the total municipal area. "Coastal" is an indicator of whether the municipality is on the coast. "Years of schooling"
is the average years of schooling of the total municipal population. "Electricity" is the municipal share of households with electricity. * p<.1, **
p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 2.6: Regression discontinuity estimates on differences in covariates of non-aligned municipalities that have a radio network
operating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Outcome: Population Urbanization Area Distance to Coastal Income Gini Index
Rate State Capital per Capita
Non-alignment -1.223 -1.815 18.679 2.638 0.037 0.582 0.513
Radio Station
Radio Network
Non-alignment x Radio Station
Non-alignment x Radio Net.
Observations
R-squared
(7.194)
1.284
(0.064)***
2.060
(0.123)***
0.023
(0.071)
-0.188
(0.135)
5,386
0.379
(1.762)
0.174
(0.016)***
0.282
(0.030)***
0.031
(0.017)*
-0.004
(0.033)
5,340
0.204
(10.555)*
0.648
(0.094)***
0.583
(0.180)***
-0.041
(0.104)
0.076
(0.197)
5,340
0.055
(1.380)*
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.023)
-0.007
(0.014)
0.023
(0.026)
5,340
0.005
(1.821)
0.038
(0.016)**
0.020
(0.031)
-0.003
(0.018)
0.009
(0.034)
5,340
0.006
(0.724)
0.057
(0.006)***
0.152
(0.012)***
0.007
(0.007)
-0.012
(0.013)
5,340
0.188
(0.495)
0.013
(0.004)***
0.006
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.003
(0.009)
5,340
0.009
Panel B
Outcome: Poverty Years of Mortality Electricity GDP Revenue Tax Revenue
Rate Schooling Rate per Capita per Capita per Capita
Non-alignment -103.198 -0.704 -0.022 -260.553 0.031 13.794 0.622
-183.029 -9.467 -0.245 (138.456)* -0.05 -8.81 -0.48
Radio Station -10.691 0.92 -0.01 6.818 0.002 -0.216 0.019
(1.630)*** (0.084)*** (0.002)*** (1.233)*** (0.000)*** (0.079)*** (0.004)***
Radio Network -26.505 2.112 -0.024 11.91 0.004 -0.143 0.059
(3.115)*** (0.161)*** (0.004)*** (2.356)*** (0.001)*** -0.153 (0.008)***
Non-alignment x Radio Station -1.55 0.074 -0.001 0.895 0 0.054 0.007
(1.805) (0.093) (0.002) (1.365) (0.001) (0.088) (0.005)
Non-alignment x Radio Net. 1.34 -0.101 -0.001 0.641 -0.001 0.014 -0.012
(3.412) (0.177) (0.005) (2.581) (0.001) (0.168) (0.009)
Observations 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,386 5,061 5,061
R-squared 0.108 0.225 0.058 0.061 0.032 0.007 0.081
Note: The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a municipal state of emergency. All specifications include
municipality fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. "Population" is the logarithmic of the total municipal population.
"Area" is the logarithmic of the total municipal area. "Coastal" is an indicator of whether the municipality is on the coast. "Years of schooling"
is the average years of schooling of the total municipal population. "Electricity" is the municipal share of households with electricity. * p<.1, **
p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 2.7: Estimates on the effect of ownership and association to network-connected
radio stations by politicians
Drought
Non-alignment
Politician Owner
Drought x Non-align.
Drought x Politician Owner
Non-align. x Politician Owner
Drought x Non-align. x Pol. Owner
Radio Network
Drought x Radio Network
Non-alignment x Radio Network
Drought x Non-align. x Radio Net.
RD Controls
(1)
0.219
(0.380)
0.005
(0.017)
0.099
(0.107)
-0.050
(0.022)**
0.104
(0.374)
-0.101
(0.116)
-0.025
(0.334)
No
Observations 36,580
R-squared 0.405
(2)
0.277
(0.419)
0.009
(0.017)
0.065
(0.095)
-0.062
(0.024)**
0.199
(0.389)
-0.047
(0.101)
-0.203
(0.364)
0.036
(0.056)
-0.096
(0.059)
-0.062
(0.034)*
0.194
(0.099)*
No
36,580
0.406
(3)
0.252
(0.387)
0.007
(0.036)
0.110
(0.109)
-0.061
(0.025)**
0.107
(0.379)
-0.117
(0.119)
-0.061
(0.336)
Yes
36,580
0.409
(4)
0.308
(0.425)
0.010
(0.035)
0.077
(0.098)
-0.072
(0.028)**
0.186
(0.391)
-0.063
(0.103)
-0.225
(0.368)
0.023
(0.052)
-0.079
(0.058)
-0.062
(0.034)*
0.172
(0.092)*
Yes
36,580
0.409
Note:The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a munici-
pal state of emergency. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. As politicians, we consider mayors, local councilors, and congress-
men. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Table 2.8: Estimates on the effect of connectivity to radio stations in other munici-
palities by shared ownership
Drought
Non-alignment
Shared Ownership
Drought x Non-align.
Drought x Shared Ownership
Non-align. x Shared Ownership
Drought x Non-align. x Shared Own.
Radio Network
Drought x Radio Network
Non-alignment x Radio Network
Drought x Non-align. x Radio Network
RD Controls
(1)
0.264
(0.396)
0.005
(0.019)
-0.014
(0.047)
-0.051
(0.023)**
0.027
(0.047)
-0.012
(0.028)
0.011
(0.049)
No
Observations 36,580
R-squared 0.405
(2)
0.314
(0.438)
0.008
(0.019)
0.032
(0.067)
-0.056
(0.025)**
0.061
(0.050)
0.006
(0.023)
-0.033
(0.052)
0.038
-0.058
-0.091
(0.066)
-0.070
(0.034)**
0.186
(0.084)**
No
36,580
0.406
(3)
0.296
(0.402)
0.011
(0.035)
-0.029
(0.045)
-0.060
(0.027)**
0.038
(0.047)
-0.011
(0.027)
-0.000
(0.048)
Yes
36,580
0.409
(4)
0.344
(0.444)
0.013
(0.034)
0.017
(0.064)
-0.066
(0.029)**
0.069
(0.051)
0.008
(0.022)
-0.039
(0.050)
0.024
-0.054
-0.080
(0.067)
-0.072
(0.035)*
0.171
(0.076)**
Yes
36,580
0.409
Note: The outcome variable is an indicator of whether the federal government declares a mu-
nicipal state of emergency. All specifications include municipality fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. "Network by Shared Ownership" indicates that a radio station
has a board member that is also part of the board of another radio station located in a different
municipality. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Chapter 3
Mobilizing Investment Through
Social Networks: Evidence from a
Lab Experiment in the Field
3.1 Introduction
Sociologists and economists have repeatedly demonstrated the importance of social
relationships in a variety of human interactions. Given that social interactions do
matter, how can organizations, e.g., villages, firms or governments, harness existing
social hierarchies to overcome inefficiencies in formal markets? In this paper, we iden-
tify social relationships within a society that permit maximal levels of cooperation.
Specifically, by studying the behavior of pairs of participants in a simple sender-
receiver investment game, 1 to which we add a third-party monitor or punisher, we
mimic a co-investment or lending opportunity and shed light on how social networks
affect the propensity for individuals to cooperate and enforce informal contracts.
The question of institutional and contract design is particularly important in de-
veloping countries. Without strong formal contracting institutions, social structures
'The two-party game is also called a trust game in the literature. We view the game as one that
naturally mimics co-investment (helping another community member invest in an opportunity that
has arisen), for instance.
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(networks) are frequently used to mediate economic and political interactions. This is
especially true in rural settings where social hierarchies are particularly salient. Com-
mon examples of network-based economic relationships include social collateral in
microfinance and ROSCAs, informal risk sharing arrangements, and increased preva-
lence of family firms. While these particular arrangements have been studied at
length, (see Feigenberg et al. (2010), Kinnan and Townsend (2010), and Bertrand
and Schoar (2006) for recent analyses of each) less is understood about the optimal
contract structure given network characteristics as inputs. For example, which mem-
bers of society serve best as third party monitors or punishers and lead to the most
efficient outcomes?
We play games modeled after Berg et al. (1995) and Charness et al. (2008) with
experimental subjects from 40 South Indian villages. Specifically, we ran each ex-
perimental session directly in each of 40 villages and drew the subject pool from the
village population. We start with a two-person game where a sender (S) transfers
money to a receiver (R). The transfer increases in size before it reaches the receiver,
who then decides how much to return to the sender. In some treatments, we add a
third-party punisher (T). Instead of anonymizing participants, the senders, receivers
and third parties (where applicable) all sit together to play each game, and are thus
able to identify each other before transfer and punishment decisions are made. In one
treatment the identifiable third party can levy costly punishments on the receivers
(and hereafter we refer to such a third party as a punisher).
Because these are small villages, there is a high likelihood that any randomly
chosen group of participants has non-trivial interaction outside the game, and we are
precisely interested in how variation in the relative network position of the third party
influences outcomes. In order to separate the mechanisms through which punishers
affect experimental outcomes, we also include an experimental treatment with a third
party who cannot punish (hereafter referred to as a monitor). In this treatment, the
monitor merely observes the interaction between the sender and receiver. We combine
the experimental results with household survey responses and village network data
to determine how co-investment behavior is mediated by network and demographic
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characteristics.
We are mostly concerned with examining how the network position of a third party
with a punishment technology affects the efficiency of the outcomes. Our experiments
are designed to separate the effects of monitoring from punishment and to measure
the causal effect of giving a punishment tool to different types of individuals in the
village. The introduction of the third party may lead to ambiguous effects. The
threat of punishment may induce the receiver to return more to the sender and, thus,
the sender to transfer more to the receiver. However, the addition of a third party
could also crowd out transfers from the sender to the receiver. 2
We wish to study how the embedding of the sender, receiver and third party
in the social network influences the efficiency of the interaction. For example, the
eigenvector centrality of a node in a network can parametrize the extent to which an
individual is important in an information transmission process. Nodes with higher
centrality tend to both acquire more and propagate more information, and other nodes
tend to have better information about the characteristics of central nodes. Viewing
centrality as a reduced form measure of network-importance within each community,
we ask what role the centrality of the third party plays in generating higher transfers.
For instance, is it the case that when the third party is more central within the
network we observe more efficient outcomes? We are also able to address how two
categories of demographic characteristics of the judge influence outcomes: caste and
whether an individual is a village elite.
To unpack the role of the third party punisher, we develop a simple model of
the three-party game. We assume that the third party punisher has preferences
over enforcing resource-sharing norms within the game and also has motives to build
reputation with the other players in anticipation of interactions outside of the game.
In the model, punishers can be of two types, high or low. High types receive utility
from fair allocations within the game and are also willing to cooperate outside of the
game, while low types do not receive utility from actions in the game and are not
2Crowd-out has been thoroughly documented in the experimental literature. Examples include
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Fehr and List (2004), and Fehr and Gschter (2002).
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willing to cooperate outside of the game.
If the punisher's type is known with certainty ex ante, then only payoffs within
the game affect the punishment decision. Low types never punish, and high types
may punish cases where the receiver only returns small amounts. However, if there
is uncertainty over the punisher's type, high types may use the game as a signaling
opportunity. We show that this behavior increases the set of cases in which punish-
ment occurs. In reaction to the equilibrium punishment strategies, we show that if
the punisher's type is unknown, receivers and senders will behave more cautiously,
and lower initial transfers will be sent, resulting in less efficient outcomes.
Because the network's ex ante information about the characteristics of peripheral
individuals is less precise, the precision of information about a node's type is a natural
way to model centrality. Thus, the model suggests that giving the ability to punish
to a peripheral judge should result in more inefficient outcomes in the laboratory
sessions relative to central judges.
Empirically, we find that on average, adding a punisher (or a monitor) to a two-
party investment game, neither increases nor decreases sender transfers. However, the
absence of a level effect masks tremendous heterogeneity in the response to changes
in the game structure and in the ability for individuals to achieve more efficient out-
comes. We find that network characteristics do interact with the game in meaningful
ways. Most notably, as our model would predict, sender transfers increase substan-
tially when the third party is central in the social network and is given the ability
to punish. These findings are not consistent with an alternative model where sender
and receiver exploit the presence of a central monitor to signal that they are a coop-
erative type. Relative to the two-party game, adding a punisher who is peripheral in
the social network is detrimental to efficiency.
We identify three additional ways in which network characteristics impact the
game. First, we corroborate other papers in the literature and find that sender -
receiver pairs of close social proximity are able to achieve better outcomes in the
two-person game than pairs of socially distant individuals. Second, we show that
social proximity can also interact with the punishment technology in negative ways:
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socially close sender - judge pairs result in lower sender transfers when the judge is
given the ability to punish. This suggests that social closeness can be used to improve
contracting outcomes, but it is important to consider the potential for collusion in
institutional design. Third, in some games and specifications we find that the social
importance of the sender is associated with lower sender transfers. While not robust
to demographic controls, this third finding is possible support of the hypothesis that
peripheral senders use the game as an opportunity to build reputation with the other
players.
We show that our demographic characteristics of caste and elite status generally
capture different dimensions of power within the village than our network measures.
We define elites as gram panchayat members, self-help group officials, anganwadi
teachers, doctors, school headmasters, or owners of the main village shop. Both high
caste individuals and elites are afforded special status in their communities. However,
in the data, the patterns of network centrality do not match (or even resemble) the
patterns of demographic importance. Namely, having an elite or high caste individual
as the third party does not significantly increase efficiency when given the ability to
punish.
Note that our results differ from previous anonymous laboratory studies such as
Charness et al. (2008), which finds that adding a punisher increases average sender
transfers, and thus efficiency. We find that while adding an average punisher does
not matter in our setting, the network characteristics of that punisher do matter.
It is not surprising then that the same game played in an anonymous setting with
strangers who have no chance of interacting in the future should produce different
patterns when played with members of a tight-knit social network where individuals
have a high probability of interacting in the future.
Our results take a step towards understanding how a community might enlist its
own social fabric to overcome a lack of formal institutions. To our knowledge, no
previous study has used high quality network data to analyze the play of investment
games with third parties. Moreover, rural India is the type of setting where net-
work effects should matter most for economic outcomes. Our results also highlight
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how social connections might have first-order effects when transplanting contracting
institutions that work in the (anonymous) lab to the field.
3.1.1 Relevant Literature
Our baseline game builds from the literature started by the Berg et al. (1995) trust
game. While the Nash equilibrium has zero transfers for anonymous partners, the
authors find that senders make positive transfers and some receivers fully reciprocate.
However, senders who transfer tend to lose money on average. Charness et al. (2008)
add a third-party punisher and find that senders transfer more and receivers recip-
rocate to a greater degree than in the case without a punisher. Initial transfers are
60% higher when a punisher is present, significantly increasing total payoffs.
While most experimental games are played with anonymous interactions, a smaller
subset of the social preferences literature examines how the outcomes of experimental
games change as the ties between agents are manipulated within the experiment
(e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Charness and
Gneezy, 2008).3 Recently, researchers have begun to combine experimental games
with existing network structures. Goeree et al. (2010) elicit peer networks of middle
school students and run dictator games with the students and find that dictator
offers can largely be explained by inverse social distance. Using networks of Harvard
students and online dictator games, Leider et al. (2009) also find social distance effects
and are able to disentangle different motivations for observed altruistic behavior. The
closest paper to ours is Glaeser et al. (2000), who study the investment game with
Harvard students. They elicit data on number of months that sender has known the
receiver, number of friends they have in common, and demographic characteristics.
3Hoffman et al. (1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999), Burnham (2003), and Charness and Gneezy
(2008) randomly give dictators fairness priming, information prompts, pictures of the receiver, or
allow the dictator to see the receiver. All find allocations made by the dictator to increase under
these treatments. Bohnet and Frey (1999) also add a treatment where both players visually identify
each other and find that dictators are far more likely to split the surplus according to the "fair" 50-
50 allocation rule. While these papers give importance evidence that familiarity (or a humanizing
force) affects experimental outcomes, they fall short of being able to explain how realistic social
dynamics interact with each participant's strategic behavior. In the developing country context,
Fehr et al. (2008) and Hoff et al. (2009) use similar games to investigate how caste affects trust and
co-investment in India.
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They do not find any significant effects of similarity of demographic characteristics
(e.g., same/different nationality/ethnicity of S and R) on behavior. They find that
senders send more and receivers return a greater share if the pair has known each
other longer or have more friends in common. Finally, they find that the sender
differentially benefits from social status - having more friends makes the sender send
less and the receiver send more.
Meanwhile, the network economics literature has developed a rich language to
characterize the importance of an individual in the network via measure such as
eigenvector centrality.4 This centrality measures typically reflect a node's importance
in transmission; more important nodes may be able to better punish others through
reputational or social capital channels. Jackson (2008) provides a detailed discussion
of the concepts. Empirical network papers employing eigenvector centrality include
Hochberg et al. (2007), Banerjee et al. (2012), and Schechter et al. (2011).
Our paper makes several contributions to these literatures. First, we are exactly
interested in studying a non-anonymous environment, wherein individuals have deep,
preexisting relationships that influence the way they behave. Individuals are called of-
ten to interact with community members, sometimes in unanticipated circumstances:
e.g., serving on a committee, PTAs, co-investing in a public good. Understanding
how the variation in the network position of the actors influences the outcomes of
these interactions is important and requires randomly matching individuals as well as
obtaining detailed data on the underlying social network of the community. We are
in the unique position of having detailed social network data in 40 villages so that
we can analyze those nuanced network features suggested by theory to play a role
in social interactions. Second, unlike dictator games or two-party interactions, we
are specifically interested in questions of institutional design and the role for outside
parties to monitor or mediate economic decisions. Our experimental treatments with
third parties allow us to ask which network properties must a third party authority
4Degree is the number of neighbors a node has, eigenvector centrality is a recursively defined
measure which defines the centrality of a node as proportional to the sum of its neighbors' centralities,
and betweenness centrality computes the share of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes that pass
through the node whose centrality we are measuring.
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possess to generate efficient (or inefficient) behavior? Third, as rural village networks
mediate most economic transactions in developing countries (and potentially substi-
tute for more formal institutions or credit markets), it is crucial to understand how
barriers to joint investment can be overcome in exactly these types of settings.
3.1.2 Structure of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we describe the
experimental subjects, network and survey data sources and the experimental design.
Section 3.3 provides a simple model of third-party punishment. In section 3.4 we
present the results, and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Experimental Design
3.2.1 Setting
Our experiment was conducted in 40 villages in Karnataka, India which range from
a 1.5 to 3 hour's drive from Bangalore. We chose these villages as we had access
to village census demographics as well as unique social network data set, previously
collected in part by the authors. The data is described in detail in Banerjee et al.
(2012) and Jackson et al. (2010).
The network represents social connections between individuals in a village with
twelve dimensions of possible links, including relatives, friends, creditors, debtors, ad-
visors, and religious company. We work with an undirected and unweighted network,
taking the union across these dimensions, following Banerjee et al. (2012) and Chan-
drasekhar et al. (2012). As such, we have extremely detailed data on social linkages,
not only between our experimental participants but also about the embedding of the
individuals in the social fabric at large.
Moreover, the survey data includes information about caste and elite status. Here
local leader or elite is someone who is a gram panchayat member, self-help group
official, anganwadi teacher, doctor, school headmaster, or the owner of the main
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village shop. Finally, the survey data contains educational attainment as well as
proxies for household wealth. We use information such as house size, electrification,
building materials, and toilet amenities to construct a ranking within each village.
3.2.2 Experiment
Each participant played five to six total rounds of three experimental treatments. 5
Players were randomly assigned one of three roles in each round: sender (S) with
endowment Rs. 60, receiver (R) with endowment Rs. 60, and third party (T) with
endowment Rs. 100. A total of 14 surveyors moderated the experiments, each over-
seeing only one group of two or three participants at a time.
The baseline game (Ti) is a two-player investment game with no third-party
monitor or judge. The surveyors select two participants at random and assign them
to roles of S and R. S can then make a transfer to R, which then triples in size.
Finally, R decides how much of his or her wealth from the game to return to S. This
transfer does not grow when sent by R. Ending balances are then recorded by the
surveyors.
In the other two treatments, we add third parties who can either monitor or
punish. Three players are randomly selected and given roles of S, R, and T. S and R
then make the same transfer decisions as in T1. In T2, T watches the transfers take
place, but does not take any additional action within the game. In T3, T observes
the transfers, and further, has the option to spend his or her own resources to levy a
monetary punishment on R. For every Rs. 1 spent by J, R loses Rs. 4.
Each participant played either 5 or 6 randomly ordered rounds of the experimental
games, including 2 rounds each of T2 and T3. Half of participants played T1 once
and the other half twice. Out of the 5 or 6 total rounds played, participants were
each given their ending wealth values for one randomly-chosen round. Participants
were given a fixed participation fee of Rs. 20 in addition to their earnings from the
game. The average payoff from participating in the experiment was approximately
5We also attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to implement a fourth treatment involving having
(S, R) pairs interact in anticipation of a T who is not from their village by using a cellular phone.
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Rs. 110, or approximately half to three-fourths of a daily agricultural wage.
In many settings individuals can choose the individuals with whom they interact.
However, there are also plenty of real-world occasions when people find themselves
needing to work together with a potentially diverse group of community members.
Examples include PTA boards at schools, new business ventures, or new clients.
Randomly matching individuals to pairs and triples of individuals in the lab we try
to mimic some aspects of the latter types of relationships. Furthermore, in some
cases, it is possible to choose the enforcement or governance structure of a group of
individuals. Thus, our goal is to detect who is the best at filling the role of the leader
or punisher. As such, randomly forming groups of individuals is instructive.
3.2.3 Norms
We designed our experiments to be able to separate between different possible re-
sponse strategies receivers may be using. There may be natural focal points for how
players choose to divide resources among themselves, which may also act as reference
points that third parties use when deciding whether or not to punish.
In his behavioral economics survey paper, Rabin (1998) discusses several sharing
norms prevalent in human behavior. We consider five natural possibilities for how the
sender and receiver may choose to share resources. Suppose that the sender transfers
Ts rupees to the receiver. The transfer grows by a factor of a before reaching the
receiver. Finally the receiver transfers -rR back to the sender. We posit five possible
norms that receivers could be playing in our experiment:
1. Keep the Entire Transfer: -rR = 0.
2. Keep the Surplus: r = rs.
3. Split the Transfer: r = Ts
4. Share the Pie: -rR = (+1) s-62 'S
5. Return the Full Surplus: r = ars.
6 Solving 60 - rs + Tr = 60 + oXrs - TR yields the result.
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We chose the multiplier a = 3 so that we could distinguish between all five cases.
Thus, the norms as a fraction of the amount that reaches the receiver are (1) 'R = 0,
(2)-2- -1-1 -i-= 1 (4) R = a+ = 2 (5) 1.7aTS a arg 2' a-rs 2a 37 ar-s
We look empirically for evidence that receivers play (some of) these norms in
Section 3.4.1, and our model in Section 3.3.2 incorporates the idea that there is a
finite set of norms that receivers may play.
3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics. In each village, 24 individuals between
the ages of 18 and 45 were randomly invited to our experiment. All together, 960
individuals participated.8 The average age is 30 with a standard deviation of 8.1
years. 61% of the participants are female, and the average education level is 8.14
with a standard deviation of 4.31.1 About 63% of the participants are general or
"otherwise backwards" (OBC) caste.' 0 Finally, 20% of households have a leader.
Turning to network characteristics, the average social proximity between pairs
(the inverse of the social distance) in our experiment is 0.31.11 The maximum social
distance, when it is finite, is 7, and the minimum is 1. 96% of pairs are reachable
(there exists a path through the network connecting the two). The average degree
(number of friends) is 9.84 with a standard deviation of 6.62, indicating that there is
substantial heterogeneity in an individual's number of connections.
3.3 Framework
In this section, we first motivate the choice of the network characteristics -centrality
and social proximity- on which we consider heterogeneous treatment effects on. Sec-
7 Notice that if a = 2, then we would not be able to separate between (2) and (3).
8See Banerjee et al. (2012) for an analysis of the diffusion of information about the game.
9This means that on average, an individual had attended 8th standard.
10There are three standard caste categories in India: general merit (GM); scheduled caste and
scheduled tribe (SCST); and other backward caste (OBC). The SCST group is traditionally the
most disadvantaged.
"Appendix 3.5 contains a glossary formally describing the network statistics used.
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ond, we develop a simple model that captures the effect of the third party punisher's
centrality, which is the main focus of our paper.
3.3.1 Network Characteristics
Rural villages in developing economies often must incorporate social relationships
when designing and enforcing business activities. Since trust and informal authority
alone must sustain these interactions, the network positions of the contracting parties
could greatly affect the scope of joint investment and other productive activities. An
important question is how the network relationships between agents impact economic
outcomes. Moreover, it may be the case that agents choose members of society to
serve as enforcers of contracting norms. As these parties themselves are embedded
in the social network, it raises the question of which network characteristics effective
judges possess. Given the innumerable ways in which networks may affect economic
interactions, we employ two different types of network characteristics in our analysis.
Two natural network measures are the centrality of each individual and the distance
between any two individuals.
The main measure we are interested in is the centrality of the individuals. There
are several reasons why centrality should matter in our experiments. We focus our
analysis on the centrality of the third party. Note that the third party has to actively
take a decision in T3 (either punish or not punish R). Thus, in T3, the third party may
gain or lose reputation in the eyes of the other participants based on her punishment
decision." The bulk of our analysis uses the eigenvector centrality as the notion
of network centrality in our analysis. Eigenvector centrality is a recursive notion of
importance wherein an individual's centrality is proportional to the sum of each of
her neighbor's centralities.
We are also interested in is that of the inverse social distance (or social proximity).
Let 79 denote the minimum path length between individuals i and j, we define social
proximity as yl. Social proximity is commonly used in the experimental networks
1 2This is not true in T2 because the third party merely is an observer. In T2 the third party's
role is to potentially propagate information outside the experiment.
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literature (e.g., Goeree et al. (2010); Leider et al. (2009)). We should expect that
unregulated interactions between pairs of individuals should have more cooperative
outcomes for those with high social proximity. The addition of a third party may
cause efficiency to either increase or decrease depending on the social proximity of
the parties involved. While a punisher might be better able to induce efficiency when
the other two individuals are social far, social proximity between a punisher and
sender might be detrimental for efficiency.
Finally, we also consider how demographic characteristics (e.g., caste and elite),
which might confound with the network measures, interact with contracting between
individuals. Two individuals belonging to the same caste group may operate much like
social proximity. However, caste also has a power dimension. High caste individuals
may be able to exercise power over low caste individuals. Moreover, being a member
of the elite in a village could also affect the power dynamic between parties. The
experimental predictions are similar to those for centrality. However, elites may be
better at resource capture than network leaders.
Throughout the paper, we consider heterogeneous treatment effects based on net-
work position. While these parameters are identified given our experimental design,
it is important to use caution when interpreting the results. We caveat that networks
are not randomly assigned. People who are central might differ from people who
are peripheral on numerous dimensions. We supplement the networks data with co-
variates that might be correlated with centrality or social proximity such as wealth,
leadership status in the community, and caste. We build a case that the network
position is what matters by ruling out these other covariates as the key drivers of our
findings.
3.3.2 Simple Model of Centrality and Punishment
We present a simple two-period model of the three-player game to focus on the ef-
fect of the third party punisher's centrality. In the first period, two players play
the sender-receiver game and the third player acts as a punisher. In the second
period, either the sender or receiver plays a coordination game with the punisher.
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The first-period game represents our laboratory experiment, and the second-period
coordination game represents the super-game individuals continue to play after they
leave our experiment. Our framework captures incentives that individuals, and in
particular the judge, may have to build reputation outside the lab.
We start by describing the strategies and payoffs. We then describe the types of
punishers. Finally, we characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the two-period
game where the second-period coordination game provides incentives for punishers to
build up reputation in the first-period game.
Trust Game with Third Party Enforcement
In the first period, a sender (S), a receiver (R), and a judge (T) play the following
game. At the beginning of the period, S receives an endowment E and decides
how much to transfer to R, which we denote as rS. TS triples in value, and R
receives 3 - rS. Then, R decides how much to transfer back to S, denoted r, and
S receives r. WLOG, we restrict R to play one of three different strategies: r E
{0, T m - Ts, ?H rs}. R can follow the high norm, qH, the intermediate norm, 7M, or
can return nothing. We assume 77H > ?7M-
We define d as the utility cost of a deviation from the high norm. We assume that
this cost can take three exogenously determined values,13 d E {0, ds, dL}:
0 if TR =H 'TS,
d = ds if ra = 77m -TS, (3.1)
dL otherwise,
We call ds a small norm deviation and dL a large norm deviation.
Next, T receives an endowment M and decides whether to punish R. The pun-
ishment is a binary decision, has a cost c to T, and incurs a penalty of fixed size r.
to R. An unpunished deviation from the high norm causes a disutility OT - d to T,
where OT E {0, 1}. This assumption captures the idea that Ts have heterogeneous
"Allowing for continuous rR and endogenous d = d (rs, TR) does not change any of the intuition
or conclusions of the model. We introduce this simplification for expositional clarity.
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types and may experience utility from norm compliance.
The first period payoffs for all three players are as follows,
Us = E - -s + rR, (3.2)
UR = 3-Ts-Tr--P, (3.3)
UT = M- T.d.(1-P)-c-P, (3.4)
where it is worth noticing that the disutility that a T of type OT = 1 experiences from
a high norm deviation is increasing with the size of the deviation.
Additionally, we assume that dL > c > ds. Under such parameter constraints,
in the absence of the second-period game, T would never have incentives to punish
small deviations of the high norm in the first-period stage game.
Coordination Game
In the second stage, either S or R plays a coordination game with T:
Payoffs satisfy a, # > 0, L > #. Punishers with OT = 0 never cooperate because
playing Low is a dominant strategy. On the contrary, when OT = 1, T cooperates
when she expects the other player to also cooperate. In this case, (Low, Low) and
(High, High) are both Nash Equilibria in this static stage game. Consider an
individual S or R who plays the above coordination game with T. Denote A to be
her belief that her counterpart T plays High. She will play High as long as
A > '. For future exposition, we denote = y.
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S or R
Action Low High
T Low ((1-0T) -L, 0) ((1 - OT) L,-a)
High (-a, 0) (#,#)
Types of Players
For simplicity, we focus on the case where only T's have type heterogeneity. We
denote 7rT to be the prior that OT = 1. This prior 7rT is equal to the population share
of high types. Additionally, we assume that T may be central or peripheral in the
social network, and that individuals know the type OT with certainty for central Ts.
In contrast, individuals have uncertainty about the type of peripheral Ts, and thus
have a prior rT over the probability that OT = 1 for any given peripheral T. We
assume that irT <y.
Timing
The timing of the two-period game is as follows,
" t = 0: Nature draws T's type, OT, and whether she is peripheral or central
" t = 1: S, R and T play the trust game with third party enforcement,
- S receives E and transfers rs,
- R receives 3 - rS and transfers rR,
- S receives rR,
- T decides whether to punish R, and
- period payoffs are realized.
" t = 1.5: S or R update irT to form A.
" t = 2: Either S or R play the coordination game with T,
- S or R and T decide whether to play Low or High, and
- period payoffs are realized.
Characterization of the Game
We look for subgame perfect equilbria, and characterize the game through backward
induction.
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Characterization of the Coordination Game in t = 2
As noted above, S or R's best response is to play High as long as A > -y. Thus, there
are two possible cases, summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If T is peripheral and A < -y or T is central and OT = 0, then the unique
stage-game Nash Equilibrium is S or R and T both play Low. However, if T is
peripheral and A > -y or T is central and Or = 1, then there exists a stage-game Nash
Equilibrium such that S or R and T both play High.
The proof is straightforward and omitted. Note that the stage game equilibrium where
S or R and T coordinate on High is the efficient static Nash Equilibrium of the stage
game. We focus on the equilibrium of the two-period game where cooperation can be
sustained, and consequently, where there are incentives for T to build up reputation
in the first-period game.14
Characterization of T's Strategy in the Trust Game with Third-Party En-
forcement
If nature draws OT = 0, then T's dominant strategy is to not punish regardless of rR.
If nature draws OT = 1, then we distinguish between the cases when T is central and
when T is peripheral. When T is central, her type is already known and thus has no
incentives to build reputation in the first period game. Given dL > c > ds, a central
T's dominant strategy (when OT = 1) is to only punish large deviations from the high
norm.
The interesting case arises when T is peripheral and Or = 1. In such a case, given
that dL > c, a peripheral T also punishes large deviations. However, T might also
now have incentives to punish small deviations in the first stage in order to build
reputation for the second period and separate from the 0 = 0 types.
When does such a separating equilibrium exist? The characterization of the third
party's strategy in the period-one game is summarized in Lemma 2.
1
4 In all subcases, (Low, Low) is also a Nash Equilibrium of the second period stage game.
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Lemma 2 Assume that dL > c > ds, ds + 0 > c, and 7rS,WR -7 > ?JT, then
given the second-stage equilibrium strategies in Lemma 1, there exists an equilibrium
punishment strategy where: 15
1. Any T with OT = 0 never punishes, regardless of -rR.
2. Central T with OT = 1 only punish large deviations from the high norm.
3. Peripheral T with Or = 1 punish large and small deviations from the high norm.
Proof 1 See Appendix 3.5
Characterization of the Sender's and Receiver's Strategies in the Trust
Game with Third-Party Enforcement
There are three cases we should consider: a) when S and R face a central T with
OT = 1, b) when S and R face a central T with OT = 0, and c) when S and R face a
peripheral T of unknown OT. Lemma 3 characterizes the strategies of S and R in the
period-one game.
Lemma 3 Assume that dL > c > ds, ds + 3 > c, TS,IR > Y > 7rT, and 1 M > 1.
Then given the equilibrium punishment rule from Lemma 2:
1. If S and R face a central T of type OT = 1, S transfers ' to R and R transfers
r. back to S.
2. If S and R face a central T of type OT = 0, S transfers 0 to R and R transfers
0 back to S.
3. If S and R face a peripheral T of unknown type, S transfers "' to R and R
transfers 17T - , back to S.
Proof 2 See Appendix 3.5
isThere also exists a SPE where nobody ever cooperates in the second stage, and nobody ever
punishes in the first stage.
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The following proposition characterizes the strategies and outcomes of the sepa-
rating equilibrium of the two-period game.
Proposition 4 Assume that dL > c > ds, ds+ > c, rS, rR _ Y > WT, and M > 1.
1. If S and R face a central T of type OT = 1, S transfers - to R in the period-
one game, R transfers r. back to S, and T does not punish R. In the period-two
game, S or R and T play (High, High).
2. If S and R face a central T of type OT = 0, S transfers 0 to R in the period-one
game, R transfers 0 back to S, and T does not punish R. S or R and T play
(Low, Low).
3. If S and R face a peripheral T, S transfers '7-' to R in the period-one game,
R transfers 7rT - , back to S, and T does not punish R. S or R and T play
(Low, Low).
It is worth noting that central Ts of type OT = 1 are better able to provide
incentives to cooperate than peripheral Ts, and hence, they enhance the efficiency of
the two-period game outcome. While a central T of type OT = 1 is able to induce a
transfer c-, a peripheral T is only able to induce a transfer -, where dfracr.iM >
7
r- , since l > 77H > 77M-
Further, this implies that average sender transfers across all peripheral Ts will be
lower than the average sender transfers across all central Ts. When T is central, the
average transfer is fjentral = while ihra' = g. Under our assumptions,
-central > eripheral
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Pooled Equilibrium Play
Before analyzing the treatment effects and network effects, it is helpful to first observe
the overall outcomes from the experimental sessions. The data include 1,988 total
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games, and Figure 3-1 shows the distribution of initial transfers from S to R observed
in all games pooled together. Almost all transfers are made in increments of Rs. 5
or Rs. 10." The modal transfer is 20, with the mean occurring at Rs. 28.5. A
zero transfer is only observed in 13 of the games. The efficient transfer of Rs. 60 is
observed 122 times (~6% of games).
Moving to the receiver's response, Figure 3-2 shows the pooled distribution of
transfers from R to S as a fraction of the initial transfer from S to R. Note that
most of the receivers transfer weakly less than the amount sent by the sender, leaving
receivers with quantities at least as high as their initial endowments17 . Only 5% of
games ended with the receiver sending more back to the sender than was initially
transferred. Also note that there are two transfer levels with notably high frequencies
occurring at R = } and 'R = 2. These values correspond to norms 2 and 4,a 3 crS 3
"keep the surplus" and "split the pie." The receivers seem to adhere to some notion
of fairness as described in the norms of section 3.2.3. The mean level of R is
approximately 0.5. Note that while, on average, both S and R gain relative to their
initial endowments, approximately 25% of senders are worse off in monetary terms
than if they had played the static Nash Equilibrium, Ts = 0.
Figure 3-3 provides an alternate illustration of R's average response to S.18 The
graph plots a nonparametric approximation of T as a function of Ts. Surprisingly,
very small initial transfers are rewarded with large return transfers (statistically in-
distinguishable from sending everything back). However, as rs > 20 the overall
relationship between initial transfer and amount returned is remarkably stable at
approximately 0.5 in equilibrium.
The equilibrium punishments incurred by the judges in T3 can also teach us
about the acceptable transfer norms in the participating villages. Figure 3-4 shows
incurred punishments as a fraction of transfers returned from R to S. On the interval
from 0 to 1, punishment is decreasing as a function of the fraction returned to the
1 6Participants could make transfers in increments of Rs. 1.
17At least before the punishment decision is made.
18We note that any relationship between player behavior and rs is endogenous. Therefore the
plots in Figures 3-3 and 3-4 are descriptions of the equilibrium and are not causal effects. They
ought to be interpreted with caution.
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sender, as would be expected from a norm-enforcer. Returning nothing is associated
with an average punishment amount of Rs. 10. This expected punishment declines
dramatically as R approaches 1. Above 1, punishment appears to be increasing,
but is very noisy. In this range, punishment enforces an unfair outcome for receivers;
their final payoffs are lower than their initial endowments.
These outcomes show that while players in the role of S tend to transfer amounts
substantially greater than zero, most games are quite far from the efficient outcome.
Further, sender transfers are quite heterogeneous. These outcomes also indicate the
that receivers tend to focus on two of the norms from Section 3.2.3 and that when
observed, punishment is decreasing in the size of the receiver's transfer, both of which
are captured in our model. We next move to understand the extent to which the
contracting structure and the social network can help S, R pairs to achieve more
efficient outcomes and can help to explain the heterogeneity of game outcomes.
3.4.2 Treatment Level Effects
We begin by analyzing the game outcomes by treatment. Table 3.2 presents the pay-
offs and sender transfers by treatment. In each specification, the omitted treatment
is the two-player game. Results in column 1 indicate that we cannot reject that the
game in which T can only observe, but not punish, has different total payoffs than
the baseline. However, the game in which T can both monitor and punish decreases
total payoffs by Rs. 9.97. In game 3, the average punishment level is 8.28 and can
mostly explain the decrease in payoffs. Columns 2 and 3 show the payoffs separated
by S and R. The entire difference in total payoffs (column 1) across treatments is
borne by R , which is again consistent with the monetary punishments eroding pay-
offs. Column 4 looks at how the initial rs, which is a measure of efficiency, responds
to treatments. None of the treatments has statistically distinguishable effects relative
to the baseline. Columns 5 to 8 indicate that results in columns 1 to 4 are robust to
the inclusion of several controls.
In light of our model, there are two opposing effects that come into play when
we add a third party who can punish. On the one hand, the punisher should be
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better able to enforce the return of larger transfers, in turn encouraging higher initial
transfers. On the other hand, low centrality judges may try to build reputation by
punishing, even for very small norm violations. This type of behavior could therefore
completely offset the positive effect of the punisher. Further, the presence of a third
party may crowd out any pro-social behavior observed in the two-party games.
Note that the Charness et al. (2008) games are played with anonymous agents,
so the social proximity of agents is 0, the relative network centralities of players can
be thought of as 0, and the value of future interactions in the supergame can also
be thought of as 0. In contrast, our experiments are played in a non-anonymized
environment in which agents are entirely socially connected. Our networks exhibit
small-world phenomena; the average proximity of senders and receivers is high (.32).
Individuals have many opportunities to interact with one another outside of our
laboratory games. Consequently, any network effects on game behavior are likely to be
extremely salient and influence the main effects in our data.Relative to our results, we
can think of the Charness et al. (2008) data as coming from socially distant pairs and
triples of individuals who all have extremely high centrality in the network and who
have no reputation-building motives with one-another. Therefore, the anonymous,
socially distant judge does not have any reputation-building incentives and only plays
the role of norm enforcer. In our games, however, the judge has two separate incentives
for intervening in the game, and the sign of the effect on overall efficiency is ambiguous.
3.4.3 Network Importance and Sender Transfers
We now address the central theme of our paper: how social networks affect the ability
for participants in an investment game to cooperate, and how giving punishment
technologies to central versus peripheral individuals affects the efficiency of outcomes.
We focus on the play of the senders, as they determine the efficiency of the outcomes.
Table 3.3 displays our main network findings. We consider measures of network
importance (top of table) and measures of network proximity (bottom of table).
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Centrality
The top portion of Table 3.3 shows how the transfers of the sender change with the
eigenvector centrality of the players. 19 We center our exposition on the columns that
include the network characteristics of the judge, because those allow us to measure
the causal effect of introducing a punishment technology.
As a preview of our main result, Figure 3-6 provides evidence that more central
judges are associated with higher transfers from S to R. Columns 2, 5, 8 and 11
of Table 3.3 confirm that, using two different measures of centrality, on average, the
most central judge induces S to transfer approximately Rs. 3.0 more to R than the
least central judge. Columns 3, 6, 9 and 12 indicate that the effect of judge centrality
is only present in the treatment in which the judge has the ability to punish. In these
specifications, the game with monitoring only is the omitted category. This result is
in line with the theoretical prediction of the model that central judges are better able
to provide incentives for cooperation. In the game with only monitoring, the judge
does not take an action, and thus does not have any scope for building reputation.
Our results confirm that this motive, which is captured in our model, is only present
when the judge is given a punishment technology.
Moreover, we find that more central senders send less to receivers, a result which
appears quite robust across all specifications with no demographic controls. While
our simple model in 3.3.2 was not designed to capture reputation motives of the S
and R, we can use the same logic to explain how the centrality of S affects transfers.
If senders use their transfers to build reputation, we should observe that transfers are
decreasing in the centrality of S because again, signals sent by peripheral individuals
are more.
'
9We include specifications with different sets of controls, and we also evaluate the regressions
with different measures of eigenvector centrality: centrality quartile and an indicator for high versus
low centrality.
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Proximity
While our biggest contribution is demonstrating the potential to employ high central-
ity third parties to possibly improve informal contracting outcomes, we also consider
the role of social proximity in encouraging cooperation. It may not be especially
surprising, but our results echo those of other related studies and suggest that social
proximity does help to foster more efficient outcomes.
To preview of our results on social distance Figure 3-5 shows the total payoffs of
S and R are increasing in sender-receiver social proximity. The bottom portion of
Table 3.3 shows how the transfers of the sender change with the social proximity of the
players. Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10 provide evidence that, in the two-party game (T1), an
increase in the social proximity between S and R corresponds to an increased transfer
from S to R. S transfers approximately Rs. 8 more to R if they are at distance one
as opposed to being socially unconnected, though the coefficient is only marginally
significant.
The rest of the columns, which include the social proximity between the punisher
and both the sender and the receiver, reflect the results for the games where we
introduce a punisher (T2 and T3). We also find evidence that in T3 as opposed to T2,
social proximity between S and T induces the sender to transfer less to the receiver.
This appears to provide evidence for collusion between the sender and the judge.
A sender-judge pair at social distance one corresponds to the sender transferring
between Rs. 10 and Rs. 12 less to the receiver than a sender-judge pair who are not
socially connected. The effect is only present in T3 where the judge is able to take
an action but not the case in T2 where the judge can only monitor and no in-game
action is required. Overall, while social proximity may improve outcomes between S
and R, it appears that social proximity between the players and the judge may also
undermine the punishment institution.
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3.4.4 Demographic Characteristics and Robustness
Because the social networks in these 40 study villages are not randomly assigned,
it is natural to ask whether our network effects are driven by other demographic
characteristics that happen to be correlated with network position. We take three
approaches. First, we show that the demographic and network characteristics pick
up different dimensions of variance in a principal component decomposition analysis.
Second, we show that other demographic characteristics that may be correlated with
the network such as caste or elite status cannot replicate the patterns observed with
the network characteristics. Third, we show that our main networks results do not
change even if we control for all available demographic characteristics.
Four of the demographic characteristics in our data, elite status, high caste,
wealth, and education, may represent power or a notion of hierarchy in the study
villages. Therefore, we check if these three variables are driving our observed central-
ity effects.
Principal Component Analysis
In Table 3.4, we present a principal component decomposition of the importance
characteristics. The decomposition contains five different measures of importance:
eigenvector centrality, elite status, high caste, wealth, and educational attainment.
The five variables separate along three distinct dimensions. Caste, wealth and educa-
tion are all key contributors to the first principal component, eigenvector centrality is
the main constituent of the second principal component, and elite status appears to
be its own dimension in the third principal component. This suggests that network
centrality does have content distinct from the other demographic characteristics.
Even though these measures may be correlated, the principal component decom-
position suggests that the demographic measures-are distinct from network centrality..
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Demographic Characteristics
Panel A of Table 3.5 presents results for sender behavior as a function of the elite
status of the participants. While there is no detectable effect of elite status on trans-
fers in the baseline two-player game (columns 1 and 4), elite status does weakly affect
how the game is played in the treatments with third parties (columns 2, 3, 5, and
6). Columns 2 and 4 indicate that, in the pooled games with a third-party, senders
who are elites send approximately Rs 2 less to receivers. Moreover, columns 3 and
6 suggest that such an effect is driven by T2. This gives some evidence that re-
sources are perhaps directed towards elites who exhibit their power in the presence
of third-parties that cannot punish them.
Importantly for our central result, whether the judge is an elite does not affect
sender transfers in either of the treatments with a third party, which suggests that
it is unlikely that the results on punisher centrality are driven by the fact that more
central people might belong to the elite.
The effects of caste composition on sender transfers are displayed in Panel B of
Table 3.5. Because we only have caste information for a subset of villages, our analysis
is quite underpowered. However, the results certainly do not suggest that the presence
of a high caste punisher contributes to the sender's transfer.
Education and proxies for wealth also cannot replicate the result that adding an
important punisher improves game outcomes. We do not include the regression results
here, but they are available upon request. (See discussion below).
Robustness to Controls
While Table 3.5 indicate that caste and elite status cannot explain the effects of
the centrality of the judge and the social proximity of the sender and receiver, we
explore an expanded set of possible importance and proximity measures in Table 3.6.
In the table, we use the same regression specification as in Table 3.3, but we also
include a full set of demographic controls, interacted with the treatment status where
appropriate.
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A natural covariate that might capture power relationships aside from elite status
is wealth. To proxy for wealth, we construct a within-village ranking of households
based on a principal component analysis of the size, construction materials, electrifi-
cation, and type of toilet facilities in their homes. As one might expect, our wealth
quantile ranking does correlate with the household's eigenvector centrality quantile.2
Further, we include the educational attainment of the players in addition to our
measures of elite status and caste.
Despite the positive relationship between centrality and the various other covari-
ates that might capture power relationships, the results in Table 3.6 indicate that the
effects of the centrality of the judge on sender transfers are robust to controlling for
those covariates. The only effects that no longer survive when we add such controls
is that of the sender's centrality.
Finally, note that we run these extended specifications using three different func-
tional forms of eigenvector centrality as regressors. We continue to use the centrality
quantile of each player in the village in columns 1 to 3, and an indicator for above-
median eigenvector centrality in the experimental sample in columns 4 to 6. Addi-
tionally, we use the level of eigenvector centrality in columns 7 to 9. We find that the
results are quite similar for all sets of specifications.
Evaluating Institutional Design
Finally, we can ask which combinations of contract enforcement mechanisms and
network characteristics produce the most efficient sender transfers. Figure 3-7 plots
sender transfers2 1 for 10 different game configurations. Panel A includes two-party
games (left-most in each grouping) and three-party games with monitors. Panel B
includes the same two-party games (left-most in each grouping) alongside results
from the games with punishers. We further consider cases where S and R axe of close
social proximity (left groupings) versus far social proximity (right groupings) and
cases where the third-party judge is of high centrality (middle bar in each grouping)
2 0The wealthiest household has a centrality ranking 13 percentage points higher than the poorest
household. The relationship is significant at all standard levels.
2 1Normalized by the average sender transfer across all of the games.
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versus low centrality (right-most bar in each grouping). The bar charts illustrate
many of our key networks results but also allow for comparisons between the three-
and two-party games.
The bar charts reinforce the result that in the two-party game, outcomes are better
when the sender and the receiver are socially close (although in this specification, the
difference is not significant). Another striking pattern is that in the games with a
monitor, neither social closeness nor judge centrality appears to affect sender transfers.
When S and R are socially close, even in the games with a punisher, don't produce
results different from the average transfer. However, the identity of the punisher
is extremely important when S and R are socially far. In these cases, when the
punisher is peripheral in the network, sender transfers are significantly lower than the
two-party outcome. However, when the punisher is central in the network, transfers
are marginally significantly higher than the two-party outcome.
These results suggest that when the contracting parties are socially close, they
can sustain reasonably good outcomes without outside intervention. However, when
the contracting parties are socially distant, third parties who have the ability to take
punitive actions may improve outcomes, so long as that individual is chosen carefully.
In our setting, the best outcomes with socially far contracting pairs occur when the
individual with the punishment technology is socially important.
3.5 Conclusion
We conduct laboratory experiments in the field with non-anonymized participants
from real-life social networks to understand how different contracting environments
affect the outcomes of joint investment games. We use detailed network data to
further analyze how the social network characteristics of participants interact with
the contracting environments to shape final payoffs. Our games are played among
individuals from rural Indian villages, who can fully identify each other, thus making
all past and future interactions between the participants relevant for how they play
our games.
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We focus on the role for third-party punishers to improve outcomes and explore
how the network centrality of the punisher impacts sender transfers. We find that the
punishment technology can help to improve outcomes, but only when the punisher
is central in the social network. We show that the monitoring function of the third
party cannot explain our results, nor can other demographic characteristics which
may be stand-ins for importance in the community. Our findings are consistent with
the model we develop where socially peripheral punishers may use their actions in
the game to build reputation about their types in anticipation of future interactions
outside of the game.
Our results provide a first analysis of how the local social network interacts with
institutional design and informal contracting. However, we have only scratched the
surface of this problem. Futher work is neccesary to take these ideas from the labo-
ratory and put them into practice.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Network Statistics
In this section we briefly discuss the network statistics used in the paper. Jackson
(2008) contains an excellent and extensive discussion of these concepts which the
reader may refer to for a more detailed reading.
Path Length and Social Proximity
The path length between nodes i and j is the length of the shortest walk between
the two nodes. Denoted -y (i, j), it is defined as -y (i, j) = minkENUoo [Ak] > 0. If
there is no such walk, notice that 7 (i, j) = oo. The social proximity between i and
j is defined as -y(i, j)' and defines a measure of how close the two nodes are with 0
meaning that there is no path between them and 1 meaning that they share an edge.
In figure 3-8, 7 (i, j) = 2 and 7 (i, k) = oo.
Vertex characteristics
We discuss three basic notions of network importance from the graph theory literature:
degree, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. The degree of node i is
the number of links that the node has. In figure 3-9(a), i has degree 6 while in
(b) i has degree 2. While this is an intuitive notion of graphical importance, it
misses a key feature that a node's ability to propagate information through a graph
depends not only on the sheer number of connections it has, but also how important
those connections are. Figure 3-9(b) illustrates an example where it is clear that
i is still a very important node, though a simple count of its friends does not carry
that information. Both betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality address this
problem.
The betweenness centrality of i is defined as the share of all shortest paths between
all other nodes j, k # i which pass through i. This is a normalized measure which
is useful when thinking about a propagation process traveling from node j to k as
taking the shortest available path.
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The eigenvector centrality of i is a recursive measure of network importance. For-
mally, it is defined as the ith component of the eigenvector corresponding to the
maximal eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix representing the graph.2 2 The intuition
for its construction is that one may be interested in defining the importance of a
node as proportional to the sum over each of its network neighbor's importance. By
definition the vector of these importances must be an eigenvector of the adjacency
matrix and restricting the importance measure to be positive means that the vector
of importances must be the first eigenvector. Intuitively, this measure captures how
well information flows through a particular node in a transmission process. Relative
to betweenness centrality, a much lower premium is placed on a node being on the
exact shortest path between two other nodes. We can see this by comparing figure
3-9(b), where i has a high eigenvector centrality and high betweenness, to (c), where
i still has a rather high eigenvector centrality but now has a 0 betweenness centrality
since no shortest path passes through i.
22The adjacency matrix A of an undirected, unweighted graph G is a symmetric matrix of Os and
is which represents whether nodes i and j have an edge.
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Appendix B: Supplemental Discussion of Model
Proof 3 (Proof of Lemma 2) Consider the case where peripheral Ts with OT = 1
do not punish small deviations. In this case, there is a pooling equilibrium where
both types of peripheral Ts do not punish small deviations. Consequently, there is no
update about the type of peripheral Ts, A=OT, and their payoff in the period two game
is 0. Alternatively, consider the case where Ts with OT = 1 do punish small deviations.
In this case, there is a separating equilibrium between both types of peripheral. Thus,
there is an update about the type of peripheral Ts with 0 T = 1, A = 1 > -y, and their
payoff in the period two game is 0. Accordingly, peripheral Ts with OT = 1 would like
to separate from peripheral Ts with OT = 0 when the benefits outweigh the costs, that
is if ds +,3 > c.
Proof 4 (Proof of Lemma 3) In case a), R anticipates that she is punished only
if she transfers 0. The payoff of such a strategy is 3 - Ts - n. On the contrary, R
can avoid being punished if she transfers qM ' rs, consequently receiving a payoff of
(3 - iM) - rs. Accordingly, R transfers 77M - Ts, as long as Ts < '. Otherwise, R
transfers 0 and anticipates a punishment of K. In anticipation of R's strategy, WLOG
S decides whether to transfer 0 or to transfer r. 23 If S transfers ' , she receives a
payoff of E - + K. Otherwise, S transfers 0 and receives a payoff of E. Thus, S
transfers ' as long as qm> 1.
In case b), when there is a central T of type OT = 0, the solution is trivial. R
expects no punishment regardless how much she sends back to S, and consequently,
she transfers 0 to S. In anticipation, S transfers 0 to R.
In case c), there is a peripheral T, who is of type OT = 1 with probabilityrT
and of type 0 T = 0 with probability (1 - ,rT). Consequently, R anticipates that with
probability (1 - IrT) she receives no punishment regardless how much she sends back
to S. Additionally, R expects that with probability7rT she will receive a punishment if
she transfers either 0 or 77m -Ts back to S, but no punishment if she transfers 7H ' TS.
Using the fact that 7 M - Ts is a dominated strategy relative to transferring 0 and a
2 3 S's optimization problem has a corner solution.
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similar reasoning to the central T with OT = 1 case, R transfers qrH ''TS, as long as
'rs < '. Otherwise, R transfers 0 and anticipates an expected punishment of ,rT - r..
Moreover, S transfers 'T" as long as 7,H > 1. Otherwise, S transfers 0.
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Appendix C: Figures and Tables
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Figure 3-1: Distribution of transfers from sender
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Figure 3-2: Distribution of transfers from receiver to sender as a fraction of the initial
transfer
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Figure 3-3: Fraction returned from R to S as a function of the transfer S to R
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Figure 3-4: Punishment cost paid by T by fraction returned from R to S
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Figure 3-5: Total payoff of S and R as a function of social proximity between S and
R
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Figure 3-6: Transfer from S to R as a function of the percentile of the eigenvector
centrality of T.
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(a) Panel A: Third-Party Monitors
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(b) Panel B: Third-Party Punishers
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Figure 3-7: Normalized Sender Transfers by Game and Punisher Characteristics
Note: In all bar charts, the y-axis represents the average transfer from the sender
to the receiver, normalized by the average transfer size. In each grouping, the left-
most bar shows transfers in the two-party game, the middle bar shows transfers in
the three-party game with a judge of high centrality, and the right-most bar shows
transfers in the three-party game with a judge of low centrality.
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Figure 3-8: Path lengths i, j and i, k
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(a)
Figure 3-9: Centrality of node i
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Age 29.95 8.14
Female 0.61 0.49
Education 8.14 4.31
High Caste 0.63 0.48
HH has a Leader 0.20 0.40
Average Proximity b/w Pairs 0.31 0.17
Average Reachability b/w Pairs 0.96 0.20
Average Degree 9.84 6.62
Average Eigenvector Centrality 0.02 0.04
Average Betweenness Centrality 0.00 0.01
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Table 3.2: Sender behavior and total payoffs
Total Payoffs Payoff S Payoff R Transfer S to R Total Payoffs Payoff S Payoff R Transfer S to R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Game w/ Monitoring 0.838 1.354 -1.180 -0.0270 2.054 0.843 0.624 0.655(2.735) (1.386) (2.247) (1.320) (2.769) (1.371) (2.516) (1.345)
Game w/ Monitoring -9.969*** 1.839 -12.47*** -1.117 -9.248*** 1.545 -11.29*** -0.641
and Punishment (2.580) (1.525) (1.927) (1.208) (2.628) (1.754) (2.314) (1.247)
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,988 1,986 1,986 1,987 1,984 1,982 1,982 1,983
R-squared 0.229 0.164 0.096 0.216 0.245 0.177 0.109 0.235
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the session level. Columns (1) to (4) only include round fixed effects. Columns (5) to (8) include controls
for sequence of games in session, order of game, round, and surveyor fixed effects. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 3.3: Sender's transfers and network characteristics
J Centrality
J Centrality - Punishment
S Centrality
S Centrality- Punishment
R Centrality
R Centrality- Punishment
Social Proximity S & R
Soc. Prox. S & R - Punish.
Social Proximity S & J
Soc. Prox. S & J - Punish.
Social Proximity R & J
Soc. Prox. R & J . Punish.
Game with Punishment
Controls
Eigen. Centrality Measure
Observations
R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.121* -1.277
(1.791) (2.256)
8.643***
(2.948)
-5.088** -2.066 0.229
(2.472) (2.083) (2.733)
-5.357
(3.289)
-1.122 1.122 3.047
(3.383) (2.004) (2.740)
-3.791
(3.321)
7.834 2.893 -0.384
(4.708) (2.996) (4.298)
7.505
(5.751)
-1.550 5.567
(2.679) (4.514)
-12.82**
(5.397)
-3.756 -0.398
(2.818) (3.779)
-6.208
(4.839)
-1.096 2.874
(1.079) (3.059)
Yes Yes Yes
Quant. Quant. Quant.
672 1,173 1,173
0.331 0.346 0.357
3.180* -1.462
(1.749) (2.128)
9.094***
(2.917)
-5.576** -1.616 0.692
(2.336) (2.059) (2.747)
-5.391*
(3.236)
-1.448 0.831 2.902
(3.171) (2.004) (2.782)
-4.122
(3.480)
8.220* 3.059 -0.627
(4.499) (3.174) (4.452)
8.202
(5.856)
-1.424 5.255
(2.635) (4.427)
-12.25**
(5.134)
-3.832 -1.189
(2.750) (3.820)
-4.680
(5.032)
-0.939 2.127
(1.088) (2.969)
No No No
Quant. Quant. Quant.
675 1,174 1,174
0.312 0.332 0.343
(7) (8) (9)
2.786*** 1.107
(0.924) (1.163)
3.186**
(1.524)
-2.879** -1.248 -0.0887
(1.303) (1.081) (1.446)
-2.690
(1.645)
-1.455 0.948 1.645
(1.495) (0.902) (1.377)
-1.470
(1.704)
7.706* 2.884 0.942
(4.057) (2.775) (3.964)
5.104
(5.624)
-1.735 4.374
(2.568) (4.129)
-11.09**
(5.054)
-4.374 -1.722
(2.803) (3.756)
-4.946
(4.942)
-1.070 2.874
(1.071) (2.379)
Yes Yes Yes
H-L H-L H-L
672 1,173 1,173
0.333 0.351 0.359
(10) (11) (12)
2.879*** 1.055
(0.907) (1.132)
3.447**
(1.521)
-3.046** -0.999 0.126
(1.280) (1.073) (1.468)
-2.601
(1.644)
-1.510 0.714 1.504
(1.450) (0.883) (1.402)
-1.699
(1.770)
7.787* 3.127 0.847
(3.995) (2.948) (4.123)
5.681
(5.716)
-1.628 4.025
(2.536) (4.118)
-10.50**
(4.908)
-4.464 -2.553
(2.755) (3.822)
-3.338
(5.134)
-0.900 2.132
(1.082) (2.255)
No No No
H-L H-L H-L
675 1,174 1,174
0.314 0.337 0.345
Note: In columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) only the game with no judge is included, and in columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), (9), (11) and (12) only games with any judge are
included. Standard errors are clustered at the room level. All specifications contain village fixed effects due to small samples of caste and co-household observations. Controls
include block, order round , and surveyor fixed effects. In columns (1) - (6), the centrality measure is the eigenvector centrality percentile within the village. In columns (7)
- (12), the centrality measure is an indicator for above-median eigenvector centrality in the experimental sample. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table 3.4: Principal component decomposition of importance measures
Principal Components
1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC
Centrality Quantile -0.0207 0.7639 -0.1986
Elite 0.3516 0.2717 0.8931
High Caste 0.5711 0.1428 -0.326
Wealth Quantile 0.6113 0.1174 -0.2363
Education 0.4196 -0.5554 0.0299
Eigenvalue 1.6034 1.2217 0.8881
Note: The columns represent the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd principal components in a principal compo-
nent decomposition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Sender's transfers, elite status, and caste
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Judge's HH Elite 0.458 0.622 0.309 0.343
(1.202) (1.548) (1.179) (1.508)
Judge's HH Elite - Punishment -0.387 -0.137
(2.171) (2.164)
Sender's HH Elite 0.167 -1.856* -3.022** 0.250 -1.716* -3.112**
(1.481) (0.973) (1.298) (1.499) (0.978) (1.347)
Sender's HH Elite - Punishment 2.275 2.723
(2.056) (2.081)
Receiver's HH Elite 1.472 1.428 1.407 1.331 1.389 1.433
(1.763) (0.900) (1.396) (1.723) (0.900) (1.375)
Receiver's HH Elite - Punishment 0.0926 -0.0197
(2.146) (2.184)
Game with Punishment -1.332 -1.718 -1.128 -1.636
(1.042) (1.110) (1.052) (1.131)
Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 699 1,240 1,240 702 1,241 1,241
R-squared 0.326 0.325 0.326 0.309 0.312 0.313
Panel B
J High Caste 1.366 2.650 0.990 3.748
(3.615) (4.819) (2.994) (3.493)
J High Caste - Punishment -1.240 -4.108
(5.717) (5.296)
S High Caste 1.935 -2.448 1.740 3.431 -3.075 1.918
(3.967) (3.864) (5.319) (3.938) (3.611) (5.617)
S High Caste - Punishment -7.679 -9.131
(7.058) (7.446)
R High Caste 1.867 -4.183 -3.516 1.967 -4.283 -3.880
(3.318) (3.830) (4.313) (2.833) (3.856) (4.422)
R High Caste - Punishment -1.047 -0.874
(5.872) (6.257)
Game with Punishment -2.779 3.306 -2.986 5.625
(3.480) (6.009) (2.908) (6.234)
Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 178 171 171 179 171 171
R-squared 0.413 0.368 0.379 0.259 0.301 0.325
Note: In columns (1) and (4) only the game with no judge is included, and in columns (2), (3),
(5), and (6) only games with any judge are included. Standard errors are clustered at the room
level. All specifications in Panel A contain room fixed effects, while specifications in Panel B
contain village fixed effects. This is because of the small sample size in the caste regressions.
Columns (1) - (3) include controls for block, order round , and surveyor fixed effects. Columns
(4) - (6) include round fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
152
Table 3.6: Robustness to demographic controls and eigenvector centrality measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
J Centrality 3.908* -0.230 3.090*** 1.546 30.06* -9.211
(2.003) (2.577) (0.998) (1.298) (16.89) (26.13)
J Centrality - Punishment 9.476*** 3.349* 71.90**
(3.273) (1.695) (28.92)
S Centrality -4.553* -1.327 1.387 -2.595* -0.881 0.437 -25.17 -7.332 -9.746
(2.598) (2.240) (2.875) (1.413) (1.163) (1.524) (18.05) (13.84) (14.88)
S Centrality - Punishment -5.240 -2.647 5.089
(3.494) (1.707) (23.88)
R Centrality -1.349 1.226 3.412 -1.268 1.087 1.965 -19.28 11.16 26.28
(3.482) (2.150) (3.005) (1.525) (0.981) (1.520) (22.86) (15.41) (16.52)
R Centrality - Punishment -4.203 -1.742 -31.41
(3.451) (1.800) (25.36)
Social Prox. S & R 8.921* 2.655 0.698 8.675** 2.687 1.918 8.171* 2.182 1.416
(4.900) (3.036) (4.397) (4.336) (2.879) (4.120) (4.371) (2.760) (3.858)
Soc. Prox. S & R - Punish. 5.510 3.490 2.366
(6.179) (5.976) (5.745)
Social Prox. S & J -1.357 5.652 -1.220 5.017 -1.395 6.324
(2.922) (4.813) (2.849) (4.405) (2.711) (4.568)
Soc. Prox. S & J - Punish. -11.94** -10.28* -12.42**
(5.951) (5.514) (5.822)
Social Prox. R & J -4.473 -0.584 -4.978 -1.943 -3.617 -0.603
(3.044) (4.162) (3.024) (4.129) (2.868) (3.822)
Soc. Prox. R & J - Punish. -7.269 -5.504 -5.452
(5.195) (5.335) (4.803)
Game with Punishment -1.142 2.836 -1.133 3.527 -1.178 3.571
(1.116) (4.839) (1.105) (4.379) (1.119) (4.156)
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eigen. Centr. Measure Quant. Quant. Quant. H-L H-L H-L Level Level Level
Observations 641 1,111 1,111 641 1,111 1,111 641 1,111 1,111
R-squared 0.330 0.363 0.382 0.332 0.368 0.384 0.330 0.363 0.380
Note: In columns (1), (4), and (7) only the game with no judge is included, and in columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) only games with any
judge are included. Standard errors are clustered at the room level. All specifications contain village fixed effects due to small samples of caste and
co-household observations. All specifications include controls for block, order round , and surveyor fixed effects. In columns (1) - (3), the centrality
measure is the eigenvector centrality percentile within the village. In columns (4) - (6), the centrality measure is an indicator for above-median
eigenvector centrality in the experimental sample. Columns (7) - (9) use the eigenvector centrality level. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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